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PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: A COMPARISON OF HUSSERL AND GIORGI

California School of Professional Psychology, Fresno   PH.D.   1985

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD:

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AND GIORGI

BY

FRANK HIROMI HOSHINO

A dissertation submitted

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

California School of Professional Psychology

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The dissertation of Frank Hiromi Hoshino,

"Phenomenological Method: A Comparison of Husserl and

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Dissertation Committee:

Ronald Teague, PhD

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December 5, 1984

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my parents,
Hiromichi and Mitsuye Hoshino; two persons
whose individual integrity and optimism
are deep influences on me, and a constant
guide.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study has been a number of years in the making. I wish to thank Peter Koestenbaum for his stimulating philosophy courses and personal conversations in the early 1970s. I wish to thank my wife, Linda Matasic Hoshino, for her support over the past seven years. Her love, kindness, and belief in me, provided encouragement and direction. Discussions and feedback on the project from Donald Coppola, Eduardo Duran, Sung Kim, and Juan Garcia, were very helpful. Of most importance, however, was my dissertation committee. Each member's expertise, interpersonal guidance, and support was instrumental in the formulation and completion of this project. I wish to thank Ronald Teague, Jeffner Allen, Robert Morgan, and, especially the chairman, Bernd Jager. Proofreading by Mary Jane Cavanaugh was appreciated.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Phenomenological Method:

A Comparison of Husserl

and Giorgi

by

Frank Hiromi Hoshino

California School of Professional Psychology, Fresno Campus

Bernd Jager, PhD

Dissertation Committee Chairman

1984

This study was a clarification of methodology in phenomenological psychology that compared the theoretical work of Edmund Husserl and Amedeo Giorgi. Specifically, three questions were addressed concerning: (a) the general structure of the phenomenological method, (b) the role of the phenomenological reduction, and (c) the meaning of sample size. The comparison found that Husserl's methodology was developed mainly for metascientific and philosophical purposes and, therefore, is not suited for practical research. Giorgi's methodology, on the other hand, was found to serve the goals and objectives of practical research by incorporating a human-subjects design. The comparison of these two theorists showed that: (a) The general structure of the phenomenological

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method is based on a descriptive approach taken to the data
of experience involving an abstention from the natural
attitude, a reduction to psychological phenomena, and
imaginative variations in order to grasp essences and
structures; (b) the role of the phenomenological reduction
is to provide access to purely psychological data or
phenomena, and (c) that the meaning of sample size depends
on the researcher's phenomenological mode of
understanding. These results were based on a presentation
of the general psychological perspectives of the two
theorists. Husserl was discussed with respect to his
philosophical background, Cartesian starting point,
psychological predecessors, and major psychological
themes. Giorgi work was discussed with regard to his
critique of natural scientific psychology, advocacy of a
human scientific psychology, some major psychological
themes, and perspective on the meaning of psychology as a
human science. It was concluded that the phenomenological
method has growing signficance in contemporary American
psychology and provides a viable humanistic alternative
approach to traditional empirical and quantitative research
methods.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The following is a study of methodology in phenomenological psychology. It compares two major developers of this research approach, Edmund Husserl and Amedeo Giorgi, and clarifies similarities and differences in their respective viewpoints. More specifically, it addresses questions concerning: (a) the general structure of phenomenological methodology, (b) the role of the phenomenological reduction, and (c) the meaning of sample size.

Phenomenological Theory and Research

Phenomenology has been viewed as a major theoretical orientation in American psychology providing the foundations for existential and humanistic psychologies, as well as providing valuable new research alternatives. Observations of this kind follow. In the March 1982 issue of American Psychologist, Joseph Royce identified phenomenology as a major theoretical trend in modern psychology. Dividing the history of psychology into two orientations, the scientific and humanistic, Royce recognized phenomenology and existentialism as the primary theoretical frameworks for humanistic psychologies.

Citing a major role for phenomenology in the

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development of modern psychology was Theodore Millon (1973) who recognized it as demarcating one of four major theoretical classes of psychological data also including the biophysical, intrapsychic, and behavioral classes (p. xii).

Sheldon Korchin (1976) wrote in Modern Clinical Psychology that phenomenology was the "framework for humanistic-existential psychotherapies" and one of "three major" types of theory for psychology (p. 354). The others were psychoanalysis and behavior learning theory.

Irving Yalom (1980) claimed that phenomenology was the "only proper method of understanding the inner world of another individual" (p. 24) and that the therapist's ability to understand the inner world of his patient was dependent on the method of phenomenology. To encounter the other without "standardized" instruments and presuppositions was at the core of phenomenological method (p. 24). Further, he added that additional research in phenomenological psychology and psychiatry was needed.

Research in phenomenological psychology has recently seen increases at the doctoral training level. Doctoral dissertations using the phenomenological method have more than tripled in the past 10 years, from 21 in the years 1972 and 1973, to 71 in the years 1982 and 1983 (see Appendices A, B, C, and D). The range of research themes has increased (see Appendices E, F, G, and H). The

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colleges, universities, and professional schools of
psychology producing phenomenological dissertations have
more than doubled in the past 10 years, from 12 in the
years 1972 and 1973, to 32 in 1982 and 1983 (see Appendices
I, and J). In addition, the number of states producing
phenomenological dissertations has almost doubled during
the years 1972-1973 to 1982-1983 (see Appendix K). The
California School of Professional Psychology has produced
57 phenomenological dissertations in the years 1973-1983
(see Appendix L).

These observations and data indicate the wide
recognition of phenomenological theory in the United
States. Yet, the significance of this theoretical and
research orientation for current psychology is hampered by
conceptual confusion and ambiguity.

Statement of Problem

Phenomenology has been a regular part of the
California School of Professional Psychology (CSPP)
curriculum both as theory and research since the school was
founded in 1969, about 15 years ago. Since this time, 10
phenomenological dissertations from the Fresno campus and
57 such studies schoolwide have been produced (see Appendix
L). This record represents a substantial contribution by
CSPP to the field of phenomenological psychology.

For some time, questions about the method of
phenomenological psychology have been raised. Over a

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decade ago, Kockelmans (1971) implored that there was still

an enormous confusion about such fundamental questions

as: "What is phenomenological psychology?" "What is the

difference and the relationship between phenomenological

and existential psychology?" and "What is the meaning and

function of phenomenological psychology in regard to

empirical psychology on the one hand and philosophy on

the other?" (p. 140). Recently, Giorgi (1982a) has claimed

that a major ambiguity about phenomenological psychology

concerns its relationship to phenomenological philosophy.

In addition to these questions and concerns about

phenomenological theory and practice, there are a number of

specific methodological questions that can be asked that

are of importance for the continued development of this

research approach. These include: (a) What is the general

structure of phenomenological methodology? (b) What is the

role of the phenomenological reduction? (c) What is the

meaning of sample size in phenomenological research?

(d) How does phenomenology view data collection and data

analysis? (e) What is the meaning of reliability and

validity of results for phenomenology? (f) Are the methods

of phenomenology and behaviorism incommensurate? and

(g) What is the relation of the phenomenological method to

hermeneutics?

Concerning these questions, the first three have been

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selected as themes for this study. They were selected
because of their relevance for on-going phenomenological
research at the California School of Professional
Psychology, Fresno campus. This relevance is shown by
overviewing a sample of the phenomenological dissertations
performed at the Fresno campus. The overview focuses on
the methodology sections of disserations by Eberhardt
(1981), Kuba (1981), Munn (1981), and Pincus (1979).

General Structure
of the Method

     The first question guiding this study concerns the
general structure of the phenomenological method. In the
study by Eberhardt (1981), the procedure involved obtaining
research participants, eliciting information about the
experience under investigation, the termination of data
gathering upon reaching a satisfactory sample size, and
treatment of the data. The last phase of the method, data
analysis, was described as involving five steps:
(a) reading the protocols, (b) formulating meanings of
constituents, (c) establishing initial categories from
clusters of meanings, (d) apprehending themes from clusters
of initial categories, and (e) stating the fundamental
structure of the phenomenon. Eberhardt's major references
for her method were Colaizzi (1978), Giorgi (1970a, 1975a,
1975c), Husserl (1975), Spiegelberg (1969), and Stevick
(1971).

In Kuba's (1981) study, her general method was
discussed in terms of how the subject-participants were
selected for the study, how questionnaire materials were
developed for use during data collection, and three
distinct methodological processes: (a) phenomenological
reduction, (b) data extraction, and (c) data analysis. The
phenomenological reduction was the "process of bracketing
preconceptions . . . while allowing the phenomenon under
study to appear in pure form" (p. 40). Data were extracted
from the researcher's observations, subject-participant
responses to a questionnaire, and significant other
responses to a questionnaire (p. 42). Data analysis
involved a "reduction phase" translating data to "meaning
units," and the "reconstruction phase . . . apprehending
essential relationships among meaning units" (p. 45).
Kuba's major methodological references were Giorgi (1970a,
1975c), Husserl (1975), Ihde (1977), Spiegelberg (1969),
and Wittgenstein (1974).

Munn (1981) explained that his method was derived
directly from the phenomenon under investigation and
referenced Colaizzi (1973) on this point. His method was
discussed in terms of the processes of subject selection,
"delimitations" (p. 17), interview technique, "saturation
criteria" (p. 20), and treatment of the data. The
treatment of the data involved seven steps: (a) epoche,
(b) initial reading, (c) extracting meaning units,

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(d) formulating meanings, (e) clustering, (f) formulating descriptions and themes, and (g) identifying and formulating the fundamental structure of the phenomenon. Munn's methodological references included Colaizzi (1973), Giorgi (1975c), Husserl (1975), Panzer (1974), Stevick (1971), and van Kaam (1959; 1966).

In Pincus's (1979) research, the method used was discussed in terms of its theoretical sampling procedure, data collection procedure, the "researcher as first subject," "delimitations of the study," and treatment of the data (p. 53). Regarding the treatment of the data, seven steps were identified based on a discussion by Spiegelberg (1969): (a) suspending belief in existence, (b) investigating particular phenomena, (c) investigating general essences, (d) apprehending essential relationships, (e) watching modes of appearing, (f) exploring constitution of phenomena in consciousness, and (g) interpreting concealed meanings. Major methodological references were Giorgi (1971a), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Husserl (1975), Nehamen (1976), Stevick (1971), and Spiegelberg (1969).

The phenomenological methodologies in these studies involved differing concepts and procedures. This fact raises our first question concerning the general structure of the phenomenological method.

Phenomenological Reduction

The second question concerns the role of the

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phenomenological reduction. In Eberhardt's (1981)

research, the reduction was not mentioned as a

methodological step. There was, however, discussion of the

related theme of seeking "presuppositionlessness" in

attending to research phenomena (p. 30).

In Kuba's (1981) study, the phenomenological reduction

was discussed as the "systematic cancellation of all acts,

judgments, reality, and practical considerations, while

allowing the phenomenon to appear in pure form" (p. 40).

It was performed in three ways: (a) by writing an initial

set of preconceptions stated prior to any contact with

research subjects; (b) by keeping a journal of the

researcher's expectations as a means of focusing and

clarifying presuppositions; and (c) by practicing

relaxation, sensory focusing, and visual imagery prior to

data analysis. The phenomenological reduction was

considered one of three major steps in the phenomenological

method.

In Munn's (1981) research, the phenomenological

reduction was discussed as the partially completed and

continuing attempt on the part of the researcher to

"portray his own biases and thoughts regarding the

phenomenon under study" (p. 27). It was the attempt to

examine the presuppositions of the researcher brought to

the research situation in order to "explicitly state the

researcher's attitudes, biases, preconceptions, and

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assumptions regarding the phenomenon under study" (p. 27).

In Pincus's (1979) study, the reduction was discussed philosophically as a "suspension in the belief in existence" or a "temporary putting aside of a priori beliefs in the existence and nature of the phenomenon under investigation" (p. 55). The researcher explained that keeping a research journal was useful in accomplishing the reduction by making explicit her preconceptions about the phenomenon.

In these studies, one researcher did not discuss the phenomenological reduction as a step in research, while other researchers variously interpreted the concept. The varying role, and absence of role, of the phenomenological reduction in these studies suggest the need for added clarification of this methodological concept.

Meaning of Sample Size

The third guiding question concerns the meaning of sample size. In the studies by Eberhardt (1981) and Munn (1981), the phenomenological meaning of sample size was discussed in terms of the concept of saturation. In Eberhardt's (1981) study, the decision to terminate data-gathering was based on the concept of saturation. It was pointed out that the Latin, saturare, literally means to be filled. (Used in the verb form, satuare, is not passive. It is indicative and active. It may, however, be used in a passive way. Hence, it means to fill.)

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Saturation, therefore, was the point at which the researcher identified a fullness in the data pool. It was the researcher's sense of being filled or satisfied with the amount and quality of data collected that influenced sample size. Eberhardt (1981) explained:

> Theoretically, in phenomenological studies, a point arises at which the addition of idiographic material might not make a difference on a nomothetic level. However, pragmatic restrictions usually do not allow one to achieve saturation to that degree. A rationale has to be developed concerning the saturation criteria for each individual research project. (p. 38)

The researcher discussed this compromise between desirable and pragmatic considerations by describing how:

> A large number of patients would yield a wide variety of experiences and thus maximize the possibility of finding an exhaustive fundamental structure of the phenomenon under investigation. However, the amount of data would be unwieldly and the analysis beyond the possibilities and temporal framework of this study. (p. 36)

In Munn's (1981) research, saturation criteria were also discussed as the basis by which the researcher knew when to terminate sampling. Saturation was achieved in this study:

> As the expressions of the participants were broken down into linguistically equivalent statements, meaning units, and then clustered around similar content, saturation entered. Once each cluster and theme, derived from each cluster, was logically linked, comprising a unified whole, the explication of the phenomenon was filled. It was saturated in that each cluster was filled and was able to be logically connected as a discreet aspect of the phenomenon in and of itself. (p. 20)

In the research projects of Pincus (1979) and Kuba

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(1981), the phenomenological meaning of sample size was discussed primarily with regard to the theoretical demands of the phenomenon under study. In Pincus's study, the theoretical sampling procedures used meant that the overall number and specific characteristics of the subjects were determined "by the emerging theory rather than preselected on an a priori theoretical basis" (p. 48). In this study, 10 clients were selected on theoretical grounds for the initial group of subjects. An additional 2 subjects were recruited later as theory developed. It was said that this procedure made it possible to "combine the minimization and maximization of differences among comparison groups in accordance with the general conceptual theme and the developing theory" (p. 50).

In Kuba's (1981) research, criteria for the selection of subjects were also determined theoretically. The researcher selected 10 subjects "on the basis of criteria established prior to the researcher's contact with the subjects" (p. 13). In this way, Kuba considered the sampling criteria used to be a priori, that is, based on knowledge not dependent on empirical verification for recognition and application.

In these studies, the procedures for determining sample size were discussed in terms of the concepts of saturation, pragmatism, and theoretical demand. However, the procedures were not applied uniformly. This situation,

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therefore, underscores the need for clarification of our second methodological question concerning the meaning of sample size in phenomenological research.

Overall, this overview of four phenomenological studies from the Fresno campus of the California School of Professional Psychology has indicated the need for clarification about three methodological questions. These questions concern the general structure of phenomenological methodology, the role of the phenomenological reduction in that methodology, and the meaning of sample size.

Definitions of Phenomenology

Further substantiating the need for the methodological clarification of phenomenology are the varying uses and definitions of the term. Its general use, referenced in Webster's New World Dictionary (1968), was defined as: "(a) the science dealing with phenomena as distinct from the science of being (ontology), (b) the branch of a science that classifies and describes its phenomena without any attempt at explanation" (p. 1098). The definition for phenomena was: "(a) any fact, circumstance, or experience that is apparent to the senses and that can be scientifically described or appraised, (b) the appearance or observed features of something experienced as distinguished from reality or the thing in itself" (p. 1098).

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A more technical use of the term was found in the field of neuropsychiatry, where it is a term referring to the description of the clinically observable. In Taylor's (1981) handbook, The Neuropsychiatric Mental Status Examination, he defined phenomenology as: "(a) the objective observation of present, not past, behavior, (b) the separation of the form and content of behavior, and (c) the use of precise terminology" (p. 4). He also considered it a "school" of thought in psychiatry, but made no references to the origins of this school (p. 4).

Philosophical Conceptions

Any review of the meaning of phenomenology must place special emphasis on its major developer, Edmund Husserl. His intentions were to use phenomenology as a method to establish the basic concepts underlying scientific and philosophic disciplines, but also to develop a scientific approach to problems of philosophy. These intentions were described when he wrote:

> (Phenomenology) . . . denotes a new, descriptive, philosophical method, which . . . has, (a), established an a priori psychological discipline able to provide the only secure basis on which a strong empirical psychology can be built, and, (b), a universal philosophy, which can supply an organum for the methodological revision of all the sciences. (1964, p. 25)

The scientific emphasis in Husserl's work was an influence originating from earlier work as a mathematician.

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Husserl's student, Martin Heidegger, viewed phenomenology in more strictly philosophical terms. Giving no particular role for the method as the means of providing the foundations of science, Heidegger (1962) wrote:

> The expression "phenomenology" signifies
> primarily a methodological conception. This
> expression does not characterize the what of the
> objects of philosophical research as subject
> matter, but rather the how of that
> research. . . . It is opposed to all
> free-floating constructions and accidental
> findings; it is opposed to taking over any
> conceptions which only seem to have been
> demonstrated; it is opposed to those
> pseudo-questions which parade themselves as
> "problems," often for generations at a
> time. (p. 50)

Heidegger's use of phenomenology was strictly ontological, and focused on related existential issues of existence, being-in-the-world, authenticity, anxiety, and being-towards-death.

While the original developers of phenomenology were of German background, French philosophers also played an important role. Jean-Paul Sartre, known for his existentialism, emphasized that phenomenology was a scientific discipline that clarified essences. He wrote that:

> Phenomenology's founder, Husserl, was struck by
> this truth: Essences and facts are
> incommensurable, and one who begins his inquiry
> with facts will never arrive at essences. . . .
> However, without giving up the idea of experience
> . . . it must be made flexible and must take into
> account the experience of essences and values; it
> must even recognize that essences alone permit us
> to classify and inspect the facts. (1956, p. iv)

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For Sartre, phenomenology clarified essences of relevance

for psychology as well as philosophy. A considerable

portion of his work examines phenomenological applications

to ontology, psychoanalysis, psychology, emotions,

imagination, and politics.

A fellow Frenchman, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, agreed that

phenomenology was a philosophy that inspected essences, but

emphasized that it also put essences back into existence.

Merleau-Ponty (1962) wrote:

> According to phenomenology, all problems amount
> to finding definitions of essences: The essence
> of perception, or the essence of consciousness,
> for example. But phenomenology is also a
> philosophy which puts essences back into
> existence, and does not expect to arrive at any
> understanding of man and the world from any
> starting point other than that of their
> "facticity". . . . It is the search for a
> philosophy which shall be a "rigorous science",
> but it also offers an account of space, time, and
> the world as we "live" them. (p. vii)

For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology was a method that put

essences back into the fact world. He wrote about a wide

variety of themes including behavior, perception, language,

and politics. He regarded phenomenology to be a method for

the study of concrete essences as well as the abstract one

Husserl was so interested in. As a psychologist as well as

philosopher by training, Merleau-Ponty extended

phenomenology equally well into both fields.

A contemporary French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, wrote

that phenomenology was a method that uncovered the

problematical in that which appears. He wrote:

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> Taken alone, the term "phenomenology" is not very
> illuminating. The word means science of
> appearances or of appearing. Thus any inquiry or
> any work devoted to the way anything whatsoever
> appears is already phenomenology. . . .
> Phenomenology becomes strict when the status of
> the appearing of things becomes problematical
> . . . phenomenology is a vast project whose
> expression is not restricted to one work or to
> any specific group of works. It is less a
> doctrine than a method capable of many
> exemplifications of which Husserl exploited only
> a few. (1967, p. 202)

Much of Ricoeur's work is directed toward issues never

exploited by Husserl, particularly the relation of

phenomenology and hermeneutics, or interpretive theory.

This overview of the varying conceptions of

phenomenology by major proponents including Husserl,

Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur, indicates

that philosophical phenomenology movement has been anything

but static. Its development has moved from origins in

post-Kantian thought, to existentialism and hermeneutics.

(For an extended discussion of this development, see

Solomon, 1972a, and Spiegelberg, 1969.)

Psychological Conceptions

Varying conceptions of phenomenology are also evident

in psychology and psychiatry (Spiegelberg, 1972). The

European existentialist and psychiatrist, Karl Jaspers

discussed phenomenological psychology in his work General

Psychopathology (1963) by saying:

> Since we can never perceive the psychical
> phenomena in others directly, as we can physical
> phenomena, it can only be a matter of empathic

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understanding, to which we can be directed by
enumerating in each case a series of external
characteristics of the psychic situation; by
enumerating the conditions under which it occurs,
by visual analogies, and by symbolization or by a
kind of suggestive presentation. In this attempt
the personal accounts of the patients, which we
can elicit and examine in personal conversation,
can help us. We can develop these most fully and
clearly, whereas those in written form composed
by the patients themselves, while often richer in
content, have simply to be accepted. Clearly,
whoever has experienced the occurrence himself,
has the best chance of finding the appropriate
description. (p. 55)

Another early proponent of phenomenology in

psychiatry, Ludwig Binswanger, espoused the view that

phenomenology was "the best approach to a deeper

understanding of what goes on in patients" especially with

regard to understanding the "phenomena of the world in

which they live" (cited in Spiegelberg, 1972, p. 211). As

Spiegelberg said:

At the start, phenomenology was for Binswanger
chiefly descriptive phenomenology. As such its
main contribution was the light it shed on
intentionality as the basic structure of the
psychological world, a new phenomenon which could
not be accounted for in terms of "naturalistic"
science. (p. 212)

For Binswanger, phenomenological description was not

limited to scientific terminology. In fact, it used

imagery and metaphor as well (Spiegelberg, 1972). As a

scientific orientation, it was not limited to the tools of

the natural sciences, but also utilized some from the

humanities.

Medard Boss, a psychoanalyst and student of Martin

Heidegger's, conceived of phenomenology in terms of the

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latter's fundamental ontology. Cited in Spiegelberg

(1972), Boss claimed that:

> phenomenology . . . consists in receiving the
> message of Being as it speaks to us. Man as the
> 'clearing' in Being is the receiver of it in the
> attitude of reverence for Being. Phenomenology
> specifically refrains from the kind of
> theoretical interpretations in which Freudians or
> Jungian psychoanalysis indulge. (p. 337)

Rollo May (1969), an American existential

psychologist, observed that phenomenology was the

"disciplined effort to clear one's mind of the

presuppositions that cause us to misunderstand our

patients" (p. 21). It was what psychotherapists used to

prevent viewing patients from the perspective of "personal

theories, dogmas, or systems" (p. 21). It was the means by

which experience of "phenomena in their full reality as

they present themselves" was achieved. It was "the

attitude of openness and readiness to hear" (p. 21).

Valle and King (1978), editors of a book entitled

<u>Existential-Phenomenological Alternatives for Psychology</u>,

specified that phenomenology was today so intimately tied

to existential philosophy that it is best to use the

expression <u>existential-phenomenological psychology</u>. For

them, it was the discipline which sought to "explicate the

essence, structure, or form of both human experience and

human behavior as revealed through essentially descriptive

techniques including disciplined reflection" (p. 7).

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Keen (1975), indicated that phenomenological psychology was based on the understanding of a person according to a methodology and approach specifically geared to that individual. He wrote:

> The phenomenological argument is that, if we want to understand people, we must approach the task with methods and with concepts that are exclusively geared to that task. To the extent that modern psychology has borrowed methods and concepts from physics, it is limited to understanding only those features of man that are shared with physical objects. To the extent that it has borrowed methods and concepts from biology, it is limited to understanding those features of man that are shared with organisms in general. Phenomenological psychology seeks to understand people as people; that is one of the reasons why it focuses on experience. (p. 116)

Raymond McCall (1983), past president of Division 24 of the American Psychological Association, the Division for Theoretical and Philsophical Psychology, said that phenomenological psychology was a "propaedeutic" or prelude to empirical psychology (p. 100). It was "a prescience that could provide the impetus for a new and improved scientific psychology" (p. 100). It was a new psychology resulting from the application of scientific, or empirical, methods to psychological phenomena "which is to say as they are in themselves and not as construed according to a model or paradigm derived from other sciences such as physics or biology" (p. 100).

The preceding review of philosophical and psychological definitions of phenomenology indicates that interpretations are varied and contrasting. Also, the

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development of phenomenology has interfaced with other
theoretical orientations, including existentialism and
hermeneutics. Given this situation, conceptual confusion
and ambiguity about phenomenological method is
understandable. (For extended discussions of the
development of phenomenology, see Solomon, 1972a, and
Spiegelberg, 1969.)

Purpose of Study

This study compares the research methodologies of
Edmund Husserl and Amedeo Giorgi as they pertain to
questions concerning: (a) the general structure of the
phenomenological method, (b) the meaning of the
phenomenological reduction, and (c) the meaning of sample
size for phenomenology. Selecting Husserl as a focus in
this study was based on his central role in the initial
development of the field of phenomenological psychology
(Allen, 1977; Binswanger, 1962; Kockelmans, 1971; Misiak &
Sexton, 1973; Spiegelberg, 1972). Without a theoretical
basis in Husserl, it would not have been possible to
address the differences between a philosophical and a human
scientific conception of phenomenological methodology.
Selecting Giorgi as another figure for discussion was based
on his role as a major contemporary expositor of the method
and cofounder of the program in phenomenological psychology
at Duquesne University. His published works are frequently
cited in the field, and his work has been one of the major

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theoretical guides for phenomenological research at the California School of Professional Psychology, Fresno campus.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is an exposition and discussion of Husserl's phenomenological psychology. It includes sections on his philosophic background, his indebtedness to Descartes for the starting point of phenomenology, his psychological influences, and major themes of his psychology. The chapter concludes with an interpretation of his methodology. Chapter 3 is a presentation and discussion of Giorgi's phenomenologically based human scientific psychology with focus on his critique of natural scientific psychology, his advocacy of a human scientific psychology, some major concepts, and his perspective on the meaning of psychology. The chapter concludes with an interpretation of his methodology. Chapter 4 is a comparison of Husserl and Giorgi that identifies similarities and differences in their conceptualization of phenomenological psychology. Three methodological questions concerning (a) the general structure of the phenomenological method, (b) the role of the phenomenological reduction, and (c) the meaning of sample size for phenomenological research in psychology are addressed. Finally, Chapter 5 is a discussion of theoretical and practical issues related to phenomenological methodology including the relation of

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behaviorism and phenomenology, the meaning of
pretheoretical experience for psychology, the recognition
of consciousness as subject matter for psychology, the
verification of research results, and the advantages and
disadvantages of phenomenological research.

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Chapter 2

EDMUND HUSSERL

Husserl's phenomenological psychology emerged out of his phenomenological philosophy. It is therefore necessary to characterize the latter as a basis for depicting the former.

Philosophical Background

Phenomenological philosophy developed out of a European philosophical context. Husserl (1977a) recognized the role of this context when he wrote:

> Phenomenology is the secret longing of the whole philosophy of modern times. The fundamental thought of Descartes is pressing toward it, Hume almost enters its domain . . . the first to perceive it truly is Kant . . . although he was not yet able to appropriate it. (p. 166)

In fact, many guiding themes for his phenomenology were developed by philosophical predecessors.

Guiding Themes

Solomon (1972a) has pointed out that two basic questions from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1965) are central to Husserl's phenomenology: (a) On the basis of experience or consciousness, how can we know the objects of the real world? and (b) How is necessary truth possible, for example, as it is found in mathematics? These are methodological questions that always remained in the background of Husserl's philosophical thinking. Much of

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his work was an attempt to develop a methodology that made possible an answer to these questions. In fact, Husserl's philosophy has been best known for its methodology, known as phenomenological method (Solomon, 1972a).

Husserl's writings were primarily concerned with method as it related to the achievement of knowledge. He was less interested in applying that method to substantive areas than to theoretical fields. For example, problems of ethics, religion, and politics were less concerns of his than establishing the foundations of scientific and philosophical knowledge.

Other guiding philosophic concerns derive from Rene Descartes (1967) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1964). The work of the French rationalist, Rene Descartes, was particularly important in that it helped to provide the rational starting point of Husserl's phenomenology (see next section). The Cartesian notion of the cogito, or thought, was reinterpreted by Husserl in such a way as to provide the point of departure for his new philosophical perspective.

Hegel's (1964) notion of philosophy as presuppositionless was also a basic theme in Husserl's phenomenology. Hegel demanded that philosophy must begin without assumptions if it was to qualify as truthful. A true philosophy should be without presuppositions, assumptions, and preconceptions of any kind. Following

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Hegel, Husserl's phenomenology attempted to achieve presuppositionlessness (Husserl, 1965). Even Husserl's use of the term phenomenology borrowed from Hegel's earlier but different use of the term in the latter's Phenomenology of Spirit (1964).

The British empiricists, including Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, were also an influence on Husserl's phenomenology (Zaner, 1970). As empiricists, these philosophers attempted to develop philosophies based on experience. Husserl developed phenomenology as a radical empiricism, or one that went beyond the limits of the British schools while retaining the original spirit of their work. However, Husserl criticized the British empiricists for their interpretations of mind as more or less a passive receptor of experiences. He also rejected their view of experience as caused in the mind by external objects (Solomon, 1972a). Husserl's phenomenology, as a radical empiricism, attempted to remove these philosophical prejudices from philosophy.

Cartesian Starting Point

Husserl's work, Cartesian Meditations (1977a), is considered among the best introductions to his phenomenology as a whole (Koestenbaum, 1964; Solomon, 1972b). For this reason, it serves as the major reference for this study of the character of phenomenology. In this work, Husserl indicated the decisive role played by

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Descartes in forming the foundations of phenomenology.

It was Descartes (1967), the French rationalist and father of modern philosophy, who first sought to reason from a few premises clearly and distinctly apprehended toward the development of a universal science that would encompass all existing sciences. It was his hope that this new philosophia prima, or first philosophy, would possess the certainty of belief and knowledge already achieved in the mathematical fields. He believed that clear and distinct premises could be the basis for all philosophical propositions, in a manner similar to the way mathematics was based on sure foundations. He wanted to construct a universal system of philosophy based on indubitable foundations.

Following Descartes, Husserl (1977a) agreed that philosophy must begin with an indubitable foundation. In Cartesian fashion, the first step for the beginner in philosophy was to attempt to suspend all beliefs and prejudices to which all thinking persons are heir. This starting point can be called a state of absolute poverty or lack of knowledge. Even the idea of a genuine science must be allowed only as a "precursory presumption" (p. 49).

Descartes's radical suspension of belief was the predecessor of the phenomenological epoche and related reductions. Through the suspension of belief, the philosopher realized one thing impossible to doubt, namely,

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the fact that thinking was occurring in the form of
doubting. This was the discovery of the cogito, or radical
basis upon which philosophy can develop. For Descartes
(1967), the cogito was discovered through the process of
systematic doubt. For Husserl, the process was discussed
in terms of the phenomenological epoche and reductions.
The process was one in which preconceived notions about the
world were methodologically suspended from belief while
maintaining their integrity as beliefs. In other words,
the world, as perceived, remains intact and unaltered.
What changes was the philosopher's awareness of the
presuppositions underlying that world. The philosopher
strips away philosophical assumptions.

Husserl's (1977a) criticism of Descartes focused on
the latter's failure to follow through with his own
program. Many of the claims and inferences made by
Descartes were viewed to be biased or prejudiced. They
were considered to be untrue to the original Cartesian
discovery of the cogito. The perspective that followed
Descartes' own work, namely, Cartesianism, was viewed as
involving a host of unexamined assumptions about the nature
of human thought and the reliability of human reason. For
example, it was assumed that the cogito was an isolated and
independent thing in itself, a res cogitans, or thinking
substance. Phenomenology rejects this interpretation of
the cogito. It would rather restate the Cartesian cogito

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in the formulation, _ego-cogito-cogitatum_, in order to show
that any particular cogito was always related to an object
and a subject (Husserl, 1977a).

However, Husserl credited Descartes for providing the
insight that philosophy should begin with first person
experience. For him, Descartes was not successful in fully
understanding or taking advantage of the meaning of his own
discovery. Phenomenology would, therefore, take up where
Descartes left off.

With the discovery of the ego-cogito-cogitatum,
Husserl (1977a) turned his focus to methodological
questions. A major concern was the question about how
consciousness was related to objects. Husserl was less
interested in the nature of the objects themselves than he
was in their relationship to experience and consciousness.
In his work, he explained not so much what the objects of
consciousness are, but the processes of consciousness that
underlie these objects, making them possible and giving
them meaning. He was interested in relating the objects of
consciousness to consciousness. He was particularly
interested in relating objects of scientific and
philosophical concern back to consciousness. He was less
interested in the facts themselves as presented within the
natural and scientific attitudes. His emphasis was on
facts in the original Latin sense of _Facere_: to make, or to
do. It was on facts qua _cogitationes_, or thoughts.

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This discussion of Husserl's philosophical background provides the basis upon which his phenomenological psychology can be characterized. (For additional discussions of his philosophy, see Solomon, 1972a, 1972b; Spiegelberg, 1969.)

Psychological Influences

Husserl's posthumously published work, Phenomenological Psychology (1977b), was his basic text on phenomenological psychology. The text was based on a series of summer lectures delivered in 1925 at the University of Freiburg in Germany and establishes phenomenological psychology as a theoretical discipline. It also provides the textual basis for the present analysis of Husserl's phenomenological psychology.

Husserl introduced his new psychology with an historical review. While noting that psychology was one of the oldest of sciences and that it was already in existence in the time of Plato and Aristotle, he was particularly interested in changes than began to occur during the 17th century. Affected by the work of scientists such as Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes, major developers of an exact science of nature, the attempt was made to reconstitute psychology in the image of the new and successful natural sciences. Yet, according to Husserl, this endeavor did not meet with the expected success. The progress of 17th- and 18th-century mathematics and physics

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greatly overshadowed the success of natural scientific psychology.

Husserl then observed that in the 19th century, this natural scientific psychology received additional impetus from the work of Wundt, Weber, Wolkmann, Helmholtz, Hering, and Fechner. These scientists were physiologists and physicists by training and applied their natural scientific methods to psychology (see Boring, 1950, for additional historical information).

This history of modern psychology took an important turn, however, with the pioneering work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1977), whose critique of modern natural scientific psychology was significant for the development of phenomenological psychology. Also significant in this developing critique, according to Husserl, were Franz Brentano's work on the concept of intentionality, and Husserl's own work, Logical Investigations (1970b). Each helped to lay the groundwork for the development of a new phenomenological psychology.

Wilhelm Dilthey

Wilhelm Dilthey (1977) criticized the attempt by natural scientific psychologists to turn against intuitive and descriptive techniques in psychology (Husserl, 1977b). Dilthey criticized natural scientific measurement approaches in his essay of 1894, "Ideen Uber eine Beschreibende und Zergliedernde Psychologie" (Ideas

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Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology) (Dilthey, 1977).

According to Husserl (1977b), Dilthey's critique was important for two reasons. First, it developed the notion that psychology was a science of psychic phenomena as revealed in immediate experience. Dilthey's discussion of "a unity of psychic life as lived" helped Husserl to develop the concept of lived-experience (p. 6). Second, it called for a descriptive psychology based on the methods of intuition and understanding. Instead of viewing psychology as an explanatory science, it was understood to be a descriptive science. Dilthey's development of these fields of research prepared the ground for a refounding of psychology on phenomenological foundations, according to Husserl (1977b).

Yet, Husserl (1977b) criticized Dilthey for his lack of clarity about how the methods of intuition and understanding were to be used in descriptive psychology. Dilthey did not work out clearly how they would be applied and how they could claim rigorous scientific status as methods. One result of this was that it was not clear whether Dilthey's descriptive psychology was a science of individual and personal experience, or a universal science (Husserl, 1977b). As we shall see later, Husserl's phenomenological psychology moved in the direction of the latter, while Giorgi's moved toward the former.

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Franz Brentano

Franz Brentano's (1973) concept of intentionality was also instrumental in the development of Husserl's phenomenological psychology. Guided by the notion of a descriptive psychology, Brentano adopted the older scholastic doctrine of intentionality and redefined it so that it could be used as a principle to distinguish psychic from physical reality. He conceived intentionality as that essential principle for descriptively discovering that which is specifically psychic. According to Husserl (1977b), Brentano went beyond the scholasticism of his day by rejecting the traditional distinction between "truly actual objects" existing in and of themselves, and "merely intentional objects" that were objects by virtue of their meanings for individuals (p. 23).

By reinterpreting the concept of intentionality beyond its then prevalent scholastic interpretation as consciousness implying real objects, Brentano (1973) reestablished intentionality as the fundamental characteristic of the psychic and as a principle by which to classify all mental phenomena. Brentano helped to remove the long standing realistic bias in the conception of intentionality.

Yet, the concept was not taken up by Husserl without changes. As Husserl (1977b) noted:

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> Brentano had not gone beyond an externally
> classificatory-descriptive consideration of
> intentional lived experiences or, what amounts to
> the same, of species of consciousness. He never
> saw and took up the great task of going back from
> the basic categories of objects as possible
> objects of consciousness . . . and inquiring
> about the entire multiplicity of possible modes
> of consciousness by which such objectivities come
> to consciousness for us. (pp. 25-26)

For Husserl, the task remained to inquire about the modes

of human consciousness that were revealed through

intentionality. He began this task in his work Logical

Investigations (1970b).

Edmund Husserl

Husserl viewed his own work, Logical Investigations

(1970b), as an attempt to apply and follow through on

Brentano's suggestions. While the product of this work was

not itself accepted by Brentano, Husserl noted that the

work was embraced by Dilthey. In this work, Husserl first

developed the method of phenomenology. He used it to

examine mental life in order to show how formal logic can

never be based on psychology, a position known as

psychologism. Using the phenomenological method, this work

provided a descriptive basis for comprehending a new level

of experience. This level was understood as a foundational

level of experience prior to personal or individual

experience, and was called "lived-experience" (p. 27).

Based on this important concept and the method of

phenomenology, Logical Investigations was instrumental for

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laying the foundations of Husserl's new psychology.

Thus Husserl built his new psychology of psychological phenomena on the groundwork provided by Dilthey, Brentano, and himself. While envisioning a distinctly different psychology from Dilthey and Brentano, he established the theoretical foundations for phenomenological psychology on the prior work of these mentors.

Major Psychological Themes

In Phenomenological Psychology (1977b), Husserl characterized the new psychology as guided by the following "mottoes" or themes: "Apriority, Eidetic, Intuition or Pure Description, and Intentionality" (p. 33). As an a priori science, Husserl intended it to determine that which was necessary for psychological experience. He explained:

> The title apriority means that this psychology
> aims first of all at all those essential
> universalities and necessities, without which
> psychological being and living are simply
> inconceivable. Only subsequently does it proceed
> to the explanation of psychological facts, to
> theory, precisely their eidetic explanation,
> which is naturally for us the first interest.
> (p. 33)

Husserl (1977b) referred to phenomenological psychology as an eidetic science because he wanted to show that the eide, or essences, of this science were necessary for psychological experience. This project and perspective is largely influenced by Kant's (1965) Critique of Pure Reason. The a priori essences of phenomenological psychology are not optional characteristics given to this

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or that psychological experience. It is the researcher's intuition that is the most important faculty in grasping psychological essences. As Husserl claimed, the motto for communicating essences to others is pure description. Finally, he referred to intentionality as the most general characteristic of the psychological. (These themes are developed below.)

John Scanlon (1977), the translator of Husserl's (1977b) Phenomenological Psychology, reviewed the book and noted that it is a "penetrating and orderly discussion of the need for and possibility of a phenomenological approach to the conceptual foundations of psychology" (p. xi). It is "less a systematic delineation of the domain and content of phenomenological psychology than a call for the possibility and need for such a psychology" (p. xi). It provides a basic conceptual and systematic framework justifying the need for phenomenological psychology as a distinct science.

According to Scanlon (1977), the systematic or theoretical part of Husserl's lectures on phenomenological psychology proceeds according to a five-step plan. The first step is to turn attention to the experiential world of prescientific experience in order to clarify the bases from which the distinct sciences can be differentiated. Husserl's intention is to identify the foundational concepts of empirical psychology and the human sciences.

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By doing so, the concepts upon which the practice of these sciences are dependent, can be clarified and developed. The accurate and full description of these basic concepts and themes is the goal of this new science.

The next move is to provide a scientific method for discovering and testing essential concepts and necessary laws pertaining to the foundations and practice of the natural and human sciences. This is the method of ideation via imaginative variation. It is described as the method that makes possible a fundamental science of the world given to experience. This fundamental science is the basis for differentiating specific regional sciences. As a method, ideation involves neither hypothetical-deductive procedures or formal analysis (Scanlon, 1977).

The next step is to discover by means of ideation the essential contrasts and intertwinings between the regions of the psychic, mental, and subjective on the one hand, and the nonpsychic, nonmental, and nonsubjective on the other. He retraces how the physical sciences eliminate the psychic, mental and subjective from consideration. This is accomplished by a purifying abstraction that produces the purely physical as exclusive subject matter of the physical sciences. Husserl then criticizes this abstractive process as leading to the theoretical absurdities of physicalism as a basis for psychology. He supports this criticism by pointing out how little success can be claimed by the

practitioners of physiological psychology (Scanlon, 1977).

On the positive side, Husserl proposes a purifying reflective method providing access to the purely psychic, purely mental, or purely subjective. This is the phenomenological reduction. Also, a few exemplary analyses of selected phenomenological themes for psychology were provided. These include preliminary examinations of perception, of spatial primal presence, of the body, and of the I (Scanlon, 1977).

The following discussion is based on four themes identified by Scanlon (1977): (a) turning attention to the experiential world of prescientific experience, (b) providing a scientific method for discovering and testing essential concepts, (c) differentiating the psychic from the nonpsychic, and (d) using a reflective method to access and reduce phenomena to the purely psychological.

Experiential World

Why was there a need to return to the world of prescientific experience? For Husserl (1977b), if it had not been the case that modern science had lost its rootedness in the experiential world, never would it have occurred that a human being would be conceived in terms of a "psychophysical machine, or parallelistic double machines" (p. 41). Psychophysical dualism as a philosophical position resulted from this separation of the material world from nonmaterial.

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It was necessary for Husserl to return to prescientific experience in order to regain the original character of immediate experience lost to the natural sciences. Husserl used the term Erfahrung, which literally means passing through, to identify that level of primordial experience. Husserl also used the expressions, the world of pretheoretical experience, and pure experience, to denote the world of prescientific experience. Such expressions referred to experience of the world prior to logical developments, that is, experience described without allowing systematic ideas about the experience to alter the description. They referred to the world of everyday life, the world of perception, of being-in-the-world, of the world in which one lives from moment to moment, and the world in which one must always live. Husserl's interest was in the world of physical and subjective intertwining, of the spatial and temporal dimensions of experience, of the ever-present perceptual field, and of sociocultural and historical meaning. For him, nature and mind were presented co-originally and intertwined, instead of separated.

In this connection, natural science was viewed as the way of relating to the world without taking the psychological contents of objects into consideration. In like fashion, the human sciences were viewed as concerned primarily with mental contents or presentations. For the

natural sciences, the basic concept was nature. For the human sciences, the basic concept was mind.

According to Husserl (1977a), nature and mind were distinguished from each other through processes of abstraction and reflection. Nature was what was left over when the scientist had eliminated everything nonmaterial from consideration. Mind was what was left over after all content referring to nature had been excluded from consideration. The physical sciences achieved their subject matter through the "elimination of all 'merely subjective' properties belonging to the things of immediate experience, of all features stemming from subjectivity" (p. 40). Material reality was isolated from psychic involvement. Any mental aspects of the experiential-world were eliminated from consideration. The original character of things as experienced was altered. The abstract world of theoretical science, therefore, was far removed from the immediacy of primary experience.

For Husserl, the return to the experiential world was crucial because it made metascientific research possible. The study of the experiential world would lead to the clarification of the guiding concepts of the human sciences and empirical psychology. The different sciences would correspond to the various forms of experiential objects of a psychological or mental type. The focus for metascientific investigation would be the various forms of

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objects present in the world of prescientific experience.
The conceptual foundations of psychology and the human
science could, therefore, be established through a priori
and essential examination of the prescientific world.

Method of Ideation

The next major theme was the method of ideation via
imaginative variation. This method was the means by which
the researcher grasped the a priori essences of the
experiential world. It was the method of essential seeing
by which different types of essences within the
experiential world were delimited. In order to
differentiate the areas of empirical psychology and the
human sciences, the method of ideation was established.
The method of ideation, also referred to as imaginative
variation, was the seeing of essences in order to disclose
the structures of the experiential world. Seeing essences
was the discovery of essences constituting the structure of
the experiential world. In Husserl's words, ideation
"discloses an infinity of variants," "assesses the
overlapping coincidence of the formation of variants into a
synthetic unity," and then "grasps what agrees as the
eidos" (1977b, p. 57).

To state it another way, the basic step of ideation
was the variation of examples through imagination to arrive
at that which must remain essentially the same in the
thematic object. Starting from a particular object, the

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researcher imagined as many variations on that object as possible without essentially changing it. This was the manner in which the object eidos was grasped.

The purpose of ideation in Husserl's phenomenological psychology was to see or apperceive essences definitive of the subject matter of empirical psychology and the human sciences in general. It was the method that used the imagination of the researcher to apprehend basic psychological essences or structures. As such, it would distinguish the various fields of psychology and the human sciences.

Psychic and Nonpsychic

The next theme was the relation between the psychic and nonpsychic and how that relation founded scientific endeavors in distinctive domains. To state this another way, the next question was to determine the essences that differentiated the human sciences from the natural sciences, and how such essences were utilized in these respective scientific domains.

The psychic or mental was analyzed into various forms of presentation. Using the methodological step of ideation, the forms in which the mental made its appearance in the experiential world were delimited. In Husserl's (1977b) analyses, he indicated that the psychic presented itself in different forms. Most obviously, it occurred in particular spatial-temporal living beings, namely, human

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beings and animals. But the psychic was not limited to living beings. It was also essential for culture in which the presence of the psychic was in the form of "communities of others" (p. 83). Art, music, architecture, and literature were psychic products of a community of others.

The hierarchical structure of the psychic included active and passive modes. Active modalities included the conscious acts of grasping, comparing, distinguishing, universalizing, and theorizing that are performed in everyday human activities. On the other hand, passive modalities were addressed when the researcher performed a phenomenological philosophical reflection on the subjective dimensions of any experience whatsoever, that is, on a priori structures of consciousness.

For Husserl, the above analyses raised questions about the relation of the psychic to the nonpsychic, and the adequacy of psychology viewed as a natural science. He was concerned with questions about: (a) how psychology can ever be truly a science of nature; (b) what the full implications were of identifying the psychic with objective nature; and (c) whether there is an inherent absurdity to such an identification. In his view, the natural scientific approach to psychology, viewed the objective world in isolation of the subjective world. Psychological objects were examined exclusive of any subjective elements or contents. Through abstraction, mind was excluded from

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consideration, and sometimes denied altogether. The
natural scientist regarded the external and physical as the
only reality.

For Husserl, there was futility and danger in this
naturalistic prejudice. It led to the view that psychic
life was to be interpreted only in terms of physical and
biological explanations. He did not deny the value of
physiological psychology, for example, but pointed out the
danger of presuming that all psychology was to be limited
to biology and physics. For him, natural scientific
psychology failed to appreciate the original character of
immediate experience. Due to material and physical
assumptions, the psychic as represented in original
experience was obscured. Accordingly, naturalistic
psychology did not form a legitimate basis for pure
psychological investigation.

In a fashion parallel to the isolation of the physical
from the psychic observed in the natural sciences, Husserl
supported the view that there was a need for human sciences
that addressed the psychological or human in isolation from
the natural. In his view, phenomenological psychology was
the pure science of the psychic that defined the
psychological essences of the human sciences through
ideation, imaginative variation, or essential seeing.

Husserl's assessment was that there was at present
within the human sciences inadequate research into purely

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psychic structures. He contended that the concept of mind in the sociocultural sciences was a conceptual muddle. Needed was increased understanding of the relationship between the pure, or abstract, concepts of mind and nature as essentially related, intertwined, and unseparated in the realm of lifeworld experience.

Husserl, himself, offered only preliminary analyses of a few psychic essences grounding the human sciences. He focused on the themes of perceptual field, perceptual space, spatial primal presence, temporality, the body, and the I.

Phenomenological Reduction

In order to investigate the psychological in its pure form, as intentionality, a particular form of reflection was required called the phenomenological reduction. It was the methodological step required for access to that which was intentional, whether the intentional object was psychological or philosophical. Husserl discussed the reduction as involving (a) the abstention (or epoche) of everyday naive beliefs and presumptions, and (b) a type of reflection that provides access to the purely psychological. It did so by reflectively examining experiences without regard to physical natural aspects present in the everyday lifeworld. It was the methodological step needed for accessing the realm of psychic essences necessary for defining the subject matter

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of the human sciences. The reduction was basic for phenomenological psychology.

Secondly, the reduction was also the step required for broaching the concerns of transcendental philosophy. The argument Husserl provided for this was complex, but can be clarified with a simple example. Basically, he discussed the reduction to psychological phenomena as the process by which intentional structures and activities of consciousness are apprehended in isolation of related physical and natural aspects. The reduction leads to philosophy in that intentional structures are of concern to philosophy as well as psychology. Take, for example, a simple act of perception. There are two distinct levels of intentionality in any act of perception, a psychological and a philosophical. The perception of a tree entails intentionality in that the tree is perceived by a particular perceiver as beautiful, old, large, or whatever. In contrast to this, the perception also entails intentionality of philosophical interest, such as, how the tree is constituted in consciousness, in space and time, and so on. The reduction, therefore, leads to philosophy by virtue of the fact that it provides access to all forms of intentionality, psychological or philosophical.

Husserl's phenomenological reduction distinguished two levels of investigation, the psychological and the philosophical. It provided access to both levels of

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investigation by establishing the proper domains of phenomenological psychology on the one hand, and transcendental philosophy on the other.

Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology (1977b) presented discussions of the major themes of his new science. The book is a critique of physicalism in psychology that returns attention to the world of immediate, and prescientific experience. It identified the methodological step necessary for discovering essential concepts upon which a fundamental science of the world given to experience is built. The application of that step was used to determine essential contrasts and intertwinings between the psychic and the nonpsychic. The work identified the reflective method by which the psychic is considered apart from the nonpsychic. In addition, this reflective activity was seen as instrumental in distinguishing the subject matters of philosophy and psychology by denoting the differing types of intentional experiences belonging to the psychological and transcendental realms. Intentionality for psychology is less general than it is for philosophy.

Husserl envisioned phenomenological psychology as the science that would clarify the conceptual foundations of empirical psychology and the human sciences. It would function as a founding discipline for any science dealing with psychical reality.

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<u>Methodology</u>

Much of the foregoing has been a discussion of Husserl's methodology. The structural components of that methodology appear to include the following. First, there is a <u>return to the pretheoretical lifeworld</u> as a key methodological theme. It has as its task the identification of the subject matter of psychology and the human sciences. As a methodological theme, it would make possible the fundamentally new type of science of phenomenological psychology which would study the a priori of this experiential world and provide the conceptual basis for systematizing psychology and the human sciences.

Returning to this level of experience requires a <u>descriptive approach</u>. To approach it via explanation would not work, given the presumption of a systematic theory underlying the explanatory process. Therefore, description is a key methodological requirement.

The <u>abstention</u> from naturalistic and everyday biases about experience, or the epoche, is a major step in Husserl's methodology. It disengages patterns of thinking about experience that constitute our common sense beliefs about the nature of reality. It brackets unnoticed assumptions that usually go unquestioned during everyday discourse. Husserl often spoke of this step in conjunction with the phenomenological reduction while pointing out its more limited function (1977b). The epoche is a bracketing

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or stripping of common assumptions from the attitude of the researcher. The reduction, on the other hand, has a more positive function in providing access to the purely psychological realm of experience.

The process of _ideation_ involves two highly related but separable methodological activities. They are the imaginative variation and the seeing of essences. The process of _varying objects of consciousness in the imagination_ can be considered another major methodological structure. It is the process of varying a particular image, essence, or structure in the imagination in order to discover its defining limits. When these limits are identified with systematic scientific rigor, then the essence being examined is identified.

This leads to the accomplishment of another methodological move, namely, the _seeing of essences_. Seeing essences is the goal of the imaginative variation. It is the clarification of essences as they are presented in conscious experiences. It involves the apprehension of a structure given to some experience through the imaginative work of the researcher. The psychological structure underlying some concrete, substantial experience is identified. For example, just as the recognition of being angry requires some understanding of what it means to be angry, it is also the case that any concrete psychological experience requires that the structure or

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essence underlying that experience be recognized and understood.

The last major structure of the methodology is the phenomenological reduction. This is the process that distinguishes the purely psychological from the influences of physical and naturalistic assumptions. It leads the researcher back to the realm of subjectivity in which the intentionality of consciousness is the primary and originary source of lifeworld experiences. The reduction leads away from the immersion in the everyday world toward pure subjective experience in which the psychological presents itself in originary form as intentionality. It is the process of accessing the purely psychological qua intentionality.

Husserl also speaks about the phenomenological reduction as leading to transcendental data and transcendental philosophy. This role of the reduction is developed through much of Husserl's philosophical works (see Kockelmans, 1976). Its function is to open the philosophical dimension of subjective experience. Not a function of psychology, this role need not be developed here. The differences in the use of the reduction for psychology and for philosophy is a matter of degree and quality. In philosophy, the reduction is performed to the most radical extent possible and makes accessible the intentional phenomena of philosophy. In psychology, it is

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used for the metascientific purposes and makes accessible the intentional phenomena of psychology. These are the psychological essences viewed as foundational for the natural and human sciences.

Our interpretation of Husserl's phenomenological method for psychology emphasized specific processes of self-reflection and applied imagination used by the researcher for the metascientific purposes of phenomenological psychology. The method is not applied to descriptive data provided by human subjects.

Chapter 3

AMEDEO GIORGI

Amedeo Giorgi was born in New York City in 1931 and
attended undergraduate school at Saint Joseph's College in
Philadelphia. He received a doctoral of philosophy degree
in experimental psychology from Fordham University in 1958,
and in 1962 joined the faculty of the psychology department
at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where
he has been working for more than 20 years.

Psychology as Natural Science

Arguing for the development of a phenomenologically
based human scientific psychology, Giorgi observed that
much of modern psychology is based on the assumptions of
natural science. In his book, Psychology as a Human
Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach (1970a), he
reported that the meaning of psychology as a science has
been dominated by natural scientific influences. Beginning
with the foundation of psychology as a science in the late
19th century, continuing through World Wars I and II, and
beyond, Giorgi found that natural scientific conceptions
and practices have had a dominating influence on
psychology. In the 19th century, for example, Wilhelm
Wundt offered lectures on such topics as "Psychology from
the Standpoint of the Natural Sciences" and "Physiological

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Psychology" (pp. 7-8), as well as established the first experimental laboratory in psychology. According to Giorgi, other theoretical works of the time include Beneke's, "<u>A Textbook of Psychology as a Natural Science</u>" in 1833, and Drobisch's, "<u>Empirical Psychology According to the Methods of Natural Science</u>" in 1842 (p. 8). Since then, the works of many other psychologists in the United States as well as Europe, bear witness to natural scientific influences. Examples can be found in works by Cattel, Ebbinghaus, Fechner, Helmholtz, James, Titchener, and Watson, according to Giorgi (1970a).

Critiques of Psychology

Giorgi (1970a) reviewed critiques of contemporary psychology and reported on the inadequacies of its conception as a natural science. He identified several areas of weakness. Psychology lacks unity. As a science, it is amorphous and hampered by a multiplicity of research approaches. It is fragmented and needs unification. For these reasons, it needs to explore, discover, and articulate the basis of its unity more fully.

Psychology lacks direction. It does not clearly perceive its own content areas and the problems indigenous to it. Psychology needs to be recentered upon its most central problems. To do this requires that it ask questions about its scientific directions and goals. How it became a science should be clarified.

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It should cease its emulation of the natural sciences. Due to its early acceptance of the model of nature and the methods appropriate to it, psychology has not developed its own model. Giorgi (1970a) observed that the method of psychology actually preceded its problems, and its institutionalization preceded its contents. Challenging this situation, he proposed that the emulation of the natural sciences be discontinued.

Psychology has not been investigating phenomena in a meaningful way. The production of knowledge has proceeded faster than the organization of that knowledge into meaningful structures. Psychology has often not studied the human being in the relevant ways, sometimes seeking results without respect to the concerns of everyday life.

Psychology lacks holistic methods. While it has developed many detailed analyses focusing on abstract problems, it has not adequately coped with "wholes, frames-of-reference, or syntheses" (Giorgi, 1970a, p. 84). Methods by which one can do justice to holistic concerns are lacking. Psychology should take more seriously the problems of holism and be less concerned with microanalysis. It needs to admit that the techniques useful for holistic research are underdeveloped.

Traditional psychology does not do justice to the human person. Much of its research focuses on animals, where the muteness of these creatures eliminates many

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possible complications. Themes sensitive to the meaning of human experience, such as freedom and courage, have not been adequately addressed. There is a kind of insensitivity to the human person.

The relevance of psychology to the "lifeworld" is deficient (Giorgi, 1970a, p. 85). The type of answers it is providing are often quite abstract, detached, and irrelevant to problems first reported by subjects. The problems that psychology studies should be closer to everyday living, that is, problems that people really worry about. More dialogue with everyday life is called for. There is too much of a gap between the current scientific literature and everyday problems.

Giorgi's (1970a) discussion of current critiques of psychology as a natural science focused on its lack of unity and direction, its emulation of the physical science, its nonmeaningful research results, its lack of holism, its injustice to the human person, and its irrelevance to everyday experience. He summarized that there is an increasing dissatisfaction concerning the direction of modern psychology. It does not appear to be justly addressing man as a person. The chief source of difficulty is its commitment to natural science. In order to help correct this dilemma, a different attitude toward science in general is required. In this respect, philosophy can help to make this possible, particularly, phenomenology.

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The solution may be to conceive psychology as an empirical human science (Giorgi, 1970a).

Giorgi (1982c) renewed his evaluation of modern psychology in his article "Issues Relating to the Meaning of Psychology as a Science." Here, he consolidated his critique of modern psychology with references to 18 articles and 11 books that discuss deficiencies of contemporary psychological theory and practice. He identified three major categories of deficiency.

1. Psychology is fragmented rather than unified. By this, he meant that key concepts in different subfields of psychology are often from highly different fields of discourse. They are often incommensurable. Giorgi (1982c) said that "thus in psychophysics, concepts like threshold, stimulus, gradients, etc., are closely allied to physics and laboratory settings; and in psychotherapy, concepts like pathology, neurosis, therapy, etc., are allied to medicine" (p. 320). What appears to be lacking is the integrative structure that would provide a common bond between the disparate areas within psychology.

2. There is a split between scientist and professional. Many of those who see psychology as a science believe that training programs should emphasize a scientific and research perspective. Many of those who view psychology as a profession do not believe such training is relevant to practical problems faced by the

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clinician. The split between scientist and professional is not one of theory and practice. If that were the case, other theoretical and practical disciplines would display the same split. Giorgi (1982c) believed that scientists structure situations according to the dictates of their natural scientific theories, whereas clinicians deal with human beings and their problems as they are presented in life, holistically and in context.

3. There is a split between psychology's commitment to be a science and to understand the whole person. Giorgi believed that the greatest division in psychology is between those who make a commitment to science and then deal with phenomena, and those who make a commitment to human phenomena and then deal scientifically with those phenomena. The contrast here is between natural science and human science. Giorgi (1982c) cited Radnitzky's (1970) work in the philosophy of science, "Contemporary Schools of Metascience," as representing the view that sciences are divisible into two types, the logical-empirical and the hermeneutical-dialectic.

For Giorgi (1982c), it was a matter of basic importance to see whether or not psychology should belong to the first traditional conception of science, or the second human scientific or critical conception. He did not believe that psychology should, or can, belong to both. His assessment of the situation is that, unfortunately,

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there is little agreement on the proposed solutions to these problems at the present time.

Reviewing some of the competing solutions, Giorgi (1982c) pointed out that: (a) some theorists argue for conceptual pluralism in psychology because its subject matter is so diversified; (b) others take the position that radical behaviorism can ultimately account for all such difficult problems including the formation of language and the experience of so-called private events; (c) some focus on philosophical assumptions about the mind and the nature of science and tries to reconcile them; (d) others observe that psychology is both science and humanism; (e) some claim that psychology is a dialectical science because human beings are always changing; (f) others maintain that psychology should remain grounded in the logical-empirical frame of reference from which it has traditionally worked; and (g) some are willing to dismember the field into many separate areas of study because the interests and themes of psychologists are so diversified.

Giorgi (1982c) proposed his own solution to the problems of (a) a fragmented rather than unified psychological theory, (b) a split between scientists and professionals, and (c) a split between scientific and person-focused commitments. He believed that the vast majority of psychologists conceive science in too narrow a way and that this situation calls for a "phenomenological

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program that would reform the concepts describing human reality" (p. 324). With a broader conception of science, there would be new opportunities to classify psychology under the umbrella of the human sciences.

Lack of Ruling Paradigm

Giorgi (1970a) believed that modern psychology lacks a ruling paradigm. He found no model of research that currently unifies the aims, subject matter, and methods appropriate for psychology. With reference to Kuhn's (1970) historical analysis of the structure of scientific revolutions, Giorgi analyzed the situation with regard to psychology.

Giorgi (1970a) viewed scientific revolution as a two stage process. The first stage is that of normal science in which the activities of scientists within a community are organized and shaped according to a model. In this stage, the community regulates the expression of scientific results and knowledge. During this stage, suppression of fundamental novelties of observation occur. Novelties, or anomalies, are suppressed because they do not conform to the basic commitments of the normative scientific praxis.

When normal science no longer is able to suppress such anomalies, the second stage emerges. This is the stage of revolution. During revolution, there is a shifting of perspective due to the surfacing of extraordinary investigations that set new commitments and fundamental

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concepts into practice. These episodes shatter traditional practices and replace them with new ones. They overturn authoritative and conservative forces because of their greater potential for success.

When science accepts a new model, it is because this model is more successful that its competitors in solving a few problems that the community of scientists regard as acute. This model is what Kuhn (1970) called a _paradigm_. For Kuhn, a scientific revolution is a change in world view. Giorgi (1970a) explained:

> When paradigms change, the world itself changes
> with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists
> adopt new instruments and look in new places.
> But even more important, during revolutions,
> scientists see new and different things when
> looking with familiar instruments in places they
> have looked before. (p. 107)

Giorgi regarded the notion of paradigm as an important advance for understanding science. When applied to psychology, Giorgi assessed that psychology is not unified under a single ruling paradigm. Given this, he claimed that it is in a _preparadigmatic_ stage of development even though natural scientific assumptions still predominate.

It was Giorgi's (1970a) contention that psychology can eventually become organized under the paradigm of human science. For him, the inadequacies and weaknesses of conceiving psychology as a natural science warrants serious consideration of alternative viewpoints.

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Realism, Empiricism, Positivism

For Giorgi, there are basically three theoretical and scientific assumptions at stake in the paradigm shift to human science. They are the assumptions of realism, empiricism, and positivism. In his article, "The Importance of the Phenomenological Attitude for Access to the Psychological Realm" (1983b), he identified these traditionally accepted viewpoints as guiding the scientific establishment in psychology. He defined these terms in the following way:

> Realism means that material objects exist external to human beings and independent of human sense experience, and it affirms that in perception one has a direct awareness or staightforward contact with the external object. Empiricists affirm that experience is the source of all knowledge and that all knowledge ultimately depends on the use of the senses. Positivism affirms that the scientific method of the natural sciences is the only valid route to knowledge and that facts are what the sciences seek. (p. 209)

For Giorgi (1983b), these truisms of traditional psychology block access to the psychological realm. He argued that these assumptions actually work to reduce all lifeworld experiences to facts of nature. An example of this reductionism is the analysis of an act of perception into electrochemical firings of nerve cells in an organism. This reduction to nature is accomplished at the cost of losing contact with the immediately psychological. Giorgi pointed out that, ironically, the very success of

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natural scientific psychology would be the elimination of
psychology!

In many ways, Giorgi's critique of natural scientific
psychology runs parallel to a path traversed earlier by
Husserl. He found fault in physical and natural scientific
psychology, just as Husserl did decades earlier. However,
Husserl's work retained an identification with
philosophical and metascientific projects, while Giorgi's
always remains within the purview of a human scientific
program.

Psychology as a Human Science

Giorgi's chief objective as a psychologist has been to
develop and articulate a systematic and rigorous psychology
conceived as a human science (Smith, 1983). His conviction
has been that this project can best be achieved by using
the philosophical framework of existential phenomenological
philosophy as the basis for this reformulation of
psychology.

Geisteswissenschaften

Conceiving psychology as a human science requires an
understanding of the historical origins of this viewpoint.
Giorgi (1970a) noted that the concept of
Geisteswissenschaften, or the human sciences, was first
developed by European philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1977)
to denote a newly articulated scientific enterprise

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standing in contrast to natural science. The term combines
two German words, <u>Geistes</u> and <u>Wissenshaften</u>. Breaking
these words down further, <u>Wissen</u> means to know, and
<u>Wissenshaften</u> refers to disciplined studies aiming at
knowledge. <u>Geistes</u> means spirit, mind, cultural world, or
human. Polkinghorne (1983) defined <u>Geistes</u> as:

> Whatever is produced or shaped by the
> intellectual and creative capacity for abstract
> thinking, conceptualizing, and logical
> reasoning. It specifies the objectifications of
> the mind--i.e., languages, religions, codes of
> law, the sciences, and the shaping of physical
> objects into human productions, such as tools,
> houses, machines, and decorations. (pp. 285-286)

Polkinghorne (1983) clarified the meaning of the
<u>Geisteswissenshaften</u>, or the human sciences, as the
investigation of all "experiences, activities, constructs,
and artifacts that would not now exist, or would not ever
have existed, if human beings had not existed" (p. 289).

   <u>Wilhelm Dilthey</u>. A German philosopher, Wilhelm
Dilthey (1833-1911) conceived of human science in
contradistinction to natural science. According to Giorgi
(1970a), the aims, presuppositions, and methods of human
science were understood to differ radically from natural
science. The human sciences sought to address the human
world, while the natural sciences sought to deal with the
nonhuman world.

   Dilthey believed that science should address not only
physical objects, but also human meanings. For example,

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when people write to each other, it is not the black ink
marks on paper that constitute the communication, but the
meanings of those black marks. For him, the realm of human
meanings was considered to be just as valid an area for
scientific investigation as the world of physical objects.
The method of examination, however, would have to differ,
since the content area differed. In human science, the
major concept of method was verstehen, or understanding
(see Polkinghorne, 1983).

Description, not explanation. In agreement with
Dilthey, Giorgi (1970a) indicated that psychologists should
not use the methods and concepts of the natural sciences as
a model for psychological research. Expounding Dilthey's
position that psychology be neither natural science nor
art, he agreed that it should be a human science whose
goals are essentially descriptive, not explanatory. A
descriptive science is one "whose units and laws are found
by empirical analysis and close examination" (p. 25). An
explanatory science is one "which takes its units and laws
from a methodological assumption which determines their
general nature beforehand" (p. 25). For Giorgi,
descriptive science is the proper framework for psychology
because "mental life is a functional unity which cannot be
reduced to or built up theoretically out of non-functional
units" (p. 25). It involves understanding and
interpretation, not theory and explanation.

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In agreement with Dilthey, Giorgi believed that only a descriptive approach can do justice to the higher functions of human thought and action. He credited Dilthey, as did Husserl, for laying essential groundwork for phenomenological psychology. By advocating a shift in perspective about the meaning and content of psychology, Dilthey began to shift the psychological paradigm from a naturalistic perspective to a humanistic one.

Embodied Person

Giorgi (1970a) departed from Dilthey in at least one important respect. This is his rejection of the idealistic interpretation Dilthey brought to the concepts of mind, spirit, and culture. Giorgi reinterpreted these concepts according to the existential-phenomenological concept of the "embodied person" (p. 53). This concept recognizes subject and object interdependence and the foundation of mind in the lifeworld. It is a notion that makes no sharp distinction between body and mind. The immediate data of human experience are an intermingling of the objective and subjective, physical and mental. The existential-phenomenological perspective identifies the immediate data of lifeworld experience to be the ultimate court of appeals for psychological truth. The concept of the embodied person elicits the idea of being both subject and object at the same time.

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Seeing the world in terms of subject-object relatedness suggests the influence of Husserl on Giorgi. The major difference for Giorgi was that the interrelation does not eventually yield to a priority given to subjectivity over objectivity, as it did for Husserl.

Some Basic Concepts

Of the basic concepts being developed by Giorgi, approach, intentionality, and lifeworld are crucial for an understanding of his phenomenologically based human scientific perspective. Of these, the concept that appears to be most originally Giorgi's is that of approach.

Approach

Approach is a pivotal concept in Giorgi's (1970a) work. It is basic for the shift in perspective from psychology as a natural science to psychology as a human science. Its value lies with its concern for how the psychologist understands the purpose of science, and the presuppositions the psychologist brings to the practice of science. The concept of approach helps the psychologist to recognize biases or views about a phenomenon that otherwise would remain invisible, or hidden. It helps to make public, from the outset, views that otherwise would simply be taken for granted or assumed. It clarifies the need to make public these views and biases while advocating their description and examination in order to make visible

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important subjective elements entailed in any scientific enterprise. By making public these interpretive elements influencing psychology, the human quality of the science is preserved. Approach, therefore, is significant for human scientific psychology because it brings out the uniquely human elements involved in the science.

By emphasizing approach, Giorgi took into account the presence of the psychologist in the practice of science. By taking into account the psychologist's point of view, the psychologist becomes more aware of the subjective element in science. By establishing these subjective elements, the work of science becomes more self-evident to its practitioners.

According to Giorgi (1970a), the concept of approach. is interconnected with the concepts of method and content. All are essential moments of any form of scientific research. The researcher necessarily engages in a dialogue with approach, method, and content issues during the practice of his science. If the researcher emphasizes one or another moment over others, then bias becomes evident. Giorgi argued that approach, method and content must be kept in balance. He criticized natural scientific psychology for failing to establish this balance.

He gave an example of the importance of approach in field of physics. Werner Heisenberg's (1966) so-called uncertainty principle was the discovery that the methods of

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physics affect the scientific understanding of the physical

phenomenon being investigated. In subatomic physics, the

electron must be conceived differently, depending on how it

is studied. It can be understood as either a wave

phenomenon or a particle.

The relation of approach, method, and content in

everyday life is seen in the example of learning to drive a

car. In this task, if priority is given to content, then

the physical movements needed to manipulate a car are

investigated with greatest detail. If priority is given to

method, there is an overemphasis on a system of study, for

example, interviewing persons who know how to drive. In

like fashion, it is just as inadequate to overemphasize

approach. To do so is to overstress the importance of the

learner's assumptions about the phenomenon in question as a

means to achieving the learning goal.

Intentionality

Another basic concept for Giorgi is intentionality.

Developed earlier by Husserl, it refers to the fact that

the fundamental property of consciousness is that it refers

to objects. As Husserl put it, the fundamental property of

consciousness is the intentional relation between a _cogito_

and a _cogitationes_. For Giorgi, this has great relevance

for psychology since consciousness is part of its subject

matter. Psychology investigates intentions and meanings.

It examines the intentional relations between consciousness

and object. Giorgi (1970a) explained that:

> We must see how meanings are experienced and
> lived and then see what perspective will be most
> suitable for understanding them as they are lived
> and experienced. . . . We must learn to
> understand the values they already have rather
> than try to superimpose values on top of
> them. (p. 159)

The implication of this is that to understand behavior, it

is necessary to inquire into its meaning, not only its

measurement. The investigation of intentional behavior

focuses on meanings, not quantifiable relations between

stimuli and responses.

Lifeworld

Another key concept for Giorgi (1970a) is the

lifeworld. His concept of it is allied closely with

Husserl's. It refers to the fact that:

> We find continually present and standing over
> against us the one spatio-temporal 'fact-world'
> to which we belong as do all other men found in
> it. This 'fact-world' we find simply to be
> there, and we take it just as it gives itself to
> us as something that exists. (p. 146)

It is "man's immediate presence to reality in which

everyday life runs its course" (p. 133). The lifeworld is

the perception of space and time belonging to others as

well as oneself. It is that which we find ourselves a part

of at all times, and that which gives itself to us as

something that exists. The lifeworld is not a strictly

physical world since it is constituted by meanings. It is

certainly not the abstract world of nuclear physics which

examines atomic structure of matter and complex
mathematical relationships. Neither is it the abstract
world of chemistry in which the physical interactions of
various forms of matter, heat, and pressure are so
important. Nor is it the world of biology in which living
creatures are examined in terms of chemical and physical
laws established in other sciences. Rather, the lifeworld
is a world of living and experiencing in which trained
scientific reflection, inquiry, and analysis are not an
essential part. It is the world in which we live out our
everyday lives.

Other general psychological concepts used by Giorgi
(1970a) include experience, consciousness, behavior,
reduction, presence, reflection, introspection,
explication, description, and expression. Each help to
ground his developing theoretical perspective. They assist
in the "obtaining, organizing, and interpreting empirical
psychological data" (p. 99) in ways that are "able to
inspire a better way of approaching psychological reality"
(p. 95).

Meaning of Psychology

Giorgi (1982c) addressed the meaning of psychology in
his article, "Issues Related to the Meaning of Psychology
as a Science." It was his belief that the meaning of
psychology as a phenomenologically based human science can
be resolved only in time. He asserted that some

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interpretations of phenomenological psychology have emphasized philosophy over human science, while others have emphasized human science over philosophy. He regarded either perspective as valid, but asserted that what is theoretically crucial is to determine "whether the two senses of the term are harmonious and, if not, to see how and why they differ" (p. 99). He did not regard as important the attempt to determine whether one interpretation is better than the other, or one correct and the other not.

Giorgi (1982c) offered his interpretation of the meaning of psychology by discussing its various delineations and dimensions. The scope of psychology is discussed in terms of its upper and lower limits. On the psychological continuum, Giorgi saw the lower end of the psychological range as requiring at a minimum life itself, that is, some "sentience, motility, and affectivity would have to be present" (p. 335). The psychological must also refer to an organism capable of "forming presentations about the environment and its own body, however, globally and undifferentiatedly" (p. 335). In other words, the lower end of the spectrum includes organisms with some evidence of conscious and presentational abilities, never inanimate objects.

On the upper end of the continuum, the psychological realm is a "biologically rooted psychophysical type of

embodiment" which is necessary for its presence (Giorgi, 1982c, p. 335). The objects in this realm are physiognomic and bound to concrete lifeworld situations. They are not the objects of the idealized world of pure mathematics and pure logic. Such objects of conscious reflection transcend the level of the psychological in his estimation. Their high level of universality and reflectivity takes them out of the psychological realm.

Giorgi (1982c) also discussed psychology in terms of perspective, levels, and dimensions. The perspective of the psychological realm is always rooted in a specific spatial-temporal environment. The psychological realm is never divorced from specific situations. It never deals with pure abstractions.

The levels of the psychological realm are many, and depend on the complexity of the phenomena studied. They include issues of action and behavior on the one hand, and experience and consciousness on the other. The psychological realm refers to organismic behavior at its most fundamental level and situated human consciousness at its highest level. It encompasses many levels of activity and experience. It is not a narrow science.

The dimensions of the psychological realm are defined in terms of their location between the physical and the rational. As a science, psychology provides knowledge that is general, but not universal. Consequently, it is not a

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rational science like formal logic or mathematics. Neither does it not produce strictly physical information. It concerns itself with relationships and structures.

Finally, Giorgi (1982c) observed that psychologists have been largely unsuccessful in establishing the subject matter of psychology. Reviewing previous attempts to define the subject matter of psychology, he concluded that at least three terms have been basic for many such attempts: consciousness, behavior, and experience. After suggesting reasons why they have not been inadequate, he attempted to revitalize them by viewing them from an existential-phenomenological perspective.

The concept of consciousness, viewed from an existential-phenomenological perspective, is a valuable corrective to the excesses of a natural scientific behaviorism, according to Giorgi. The character of consciousness is its presentational function, that is, the fact that it presents the world and its objects. Agreeing with Ey (1973), Giorgi (1982c) contends that consciousness is "the system of vital relations which binds the subject to others and to the world" (p. 3).

The concept of experience was interpreted by Giorgi in a manner akin to that offered by Husserl (1973) in his work Experience and judgment. Its phenomenological value lies in its sense as Erfahrung (literally, traveling through), or experiential world. Objects are viewed within an

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existential matrix of being-in-time, being-in-space, and with intentional interconnections with other objects.

Giorgi's (1982c) interpretation of the notion of behavior, influenced particularly by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1963), the French philosopher and psychologist, was that behavior conceived neutrally with respect to the traditional distinction between mind and body is highly valuable for psychology. For Giorgi, this neutrality enables the psychologist to dispense with causal lines of explanation involving the assumptions of either free will or determinism.

The concepts of consciousness, experience, and behavior, however, were viewed as lacking as subject matters for psychology (Giorgi, 1982c). His review of these terms led him to the conclusion that an additional term may better reflect the subject matter of psychology. So, he offered a concept of his own, expressiveness.

Giorgi (1982c) believed that expressiveness has several advantages over the other terms. He asserted that it suggests greater comprehensiveness since the other terms are contained within it. It suggests concreteness since physiognomic and other unique aspects of an individual are included within it. Expressiveness takes into account both internal and external perspectives. It implies both the expressor and observers of expressions. It also implies a materiality, so all "bodily activities and references would

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also be included in the analysis" (p. 336). With these advantages, Giorgi regarded expressiveness as preferable to the other terms defining the subject matter of psychology.

In a recent article, "Concerning the Possibility of Phenomenological Psychology," Giorgi (1983a) acknowledged that there is need for more information about "how to do phenomenological psychological research" (p. 164). He indicated that his own work has focused mainly on establishing the possibility of this form of research. Since theoretical obstacles still stand in the way of its use, he stated that "unfortunately, the very possibility of doing phenomenologically grounded or inspired psychological research is still too little understood by the majority of psychologists" (p. 164). The problems that stand in the way of a better understanding of this research are mainly two.

1. One problem is the existence of numerous misconceptions concerning the very meaning of phenomenology. Giorgi (1983a) noted that it should not be considered merely introspective, merely subjective, merely experiential, merely ideographic, merely inner or private, antiscience, merely propaedeutic, speculative, necessarily antidata, and antitraditional.

2. A second problem for Giorgi (1983a) is the more subtle but equally real fact that phenomenological psychological scientific practice "still has to be invented

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and developed" (p. 165). He noted that phenomenological philosophy cannot be the guide for psychological practice: "Since tried and tested procedures do not exist, very little has been produced, and thus many psychologists take the lack, when coupled with the misconceptions, as a proof of its impossibility" (p. 165).

Methodology

Until Giorgi publishes a statement on the specifics of phenomenological methodology, any presentation of his view can only be provisional. Up to this point, much of his work has been a clarification of the salient themes of this research method. Perhaps his major contribution has been to clarify the meaning of approach. By emphasizing the influence of the researcher's presence on research, Giorgi clarified the phenomenological viewpoint which recognizes that the researcher is involved in the constitution of (a) the research situation, (b) the data, (c) the research method, and (d) the interpretation and communication procedures.

However, Giorgi (1979b) provided a general schema to his methodology. Based on his unpublished research on learning, Giorgi identified the schematic elements of his methodology, and how he arrived at them. When he first began studying learning, he did so with regard to how it was lived by ordinary people in the lifeworld. He deliberately avoided getting descriptions from specialists

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such as students, educators, and colleagues. This was done in order to prevent the possibility of receiving descriptions based on theories of learning instead of naive descriptions. The descriptions received included such experiences as "learning to bake bread to learning how to cope with business losses" (p. 82).

Attempting to be "qualitative and essentially rigorous" in his approach to research, Giorgi (1979b) developed a general schema for the analysis of descriptive data based on his data analyses of naive descriptions of learning experiences obtained from research subjects. He wrote:

> (1) The researcher reads the entire description of the learning situation straight through to get a sense of the whole. (2) Next, the researcher reads the same description more slowly and delineates each time that a transition in meaning is perceived with respect to the intention of discovering the meaning of learning. After this procedure the researcher has a series of meaning units or constituents. (3) The researcher then eliminates redundancies and clarifies or elaborates to himself the meaning of the units he just constituted by relating them to each other and to the sense of the whole. (4) The researcher reflects on the given units, still expressed essentially in the concrete language of the subject, and comes up with the essence of that situation for the subject with respect to the phenomenon of learning. Each unit is systematically interrogated for what it reveals about the learning process in that situation for that subject. The researcher transforms each unit, when relevant, into the language of psychological science. (5) The researcher synthesizes and integrates the insights achieved into a consistent description of the structure of learning. (p. 83)

In this analysis, Giorgi's aim was to see what was

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psychologically relevant in the descriptions about learning. Moving from what the learning situation meant for the subjects, he turned to what it meant for psychologists. Looking at the descriptions from a scientific point of view led him to recognize the value of dividing the descriptions into different categories as a way of organizing the wealth of descriptive data.

With respect to these analyses, the terms of structure, level, and type have been useful ones for Giorgi (1979b). They have helped him to organize the kind of results he has obtained in his research. He found that descriptions "tended to cluster about certain types, and the only way [he] could get a structure that really comprehended all of the examples [was] to get excessively abstract" (p. 83). To avoid this, he tried to control for type of descriptions by ascertaining a "different structure for each type of learning situation rather than a universal structure that would comprehend each individual learning situation singly" (p. 83). He found that by asking about a specific type of learning situation, the descriptions would vary according to theme and not, as before, according to a variety of themes within a broad field of inquiry.

The structure referred to the general or primary organizing principles of consciousness, a "network of relations that is lived through rather than known . . . thus to be aware of a structure is to be present to the

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very organization of the world as one lives and thinks it" (p. 87). The level referred to the degree of presence of a structure, that is, the degree to which a structure is apprehended. The type referred to changes in appearance of the structure (see Polkinghorne's, 1983, discussion of these points).

The goal of this form of research was to understand the experiences of research subjects (Giorgi, 1971a). This required obtaining descriptions from subjects obtained through interviews, requests in writing, and other methods. In principle, a variety of procedures for obtaining descriptive information was possible. The researcher evaluated the descriptions for main themes by identifying natural meaning units in the description. These were reflected upon as constituents of the whole experience. Attention was given to how each meaning unit was expressed in the natural language of the subjects. The researcher expressed the experience in less naive language, that is, in the psychological language. The structure of the experience was obtained first in terms of the specific situation, or type, in which it arose. This was the situated structure of the experience. Comparing variations across subjects, the apprehension of a general structure was achieved by synthesizing and integrating the insights obtained into a consistent description of the structure of the phenomenon.

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In summary, Giorgi has yet to provide a definitive statement about phenomenological method or how to do phenomenological research. In fact, the literature supports the view that there is no one phenomenological method. Rather, there appears to be a family of methods sharing some general features. (For a variety of examples, see Colaizzi, 1978; Fischer, W., 1978; Giorgi, 1975a; Jager, 1983; Kruger, 1981; Stevick, 1971; Stones, 1981.) In Giorgi's (1982a) words, methodology in phenomenological psychology contains, at a minimum, an "approach to phenomena at a more concrete level in a way that is descriptive, uses some form of reduction, and searches for essences through imaginative variation" (p. 96). Also, it is rigorous, systematic, and shaped by the phenomenon being researched.

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Chapter 4

COMPARISON

The presentations on Husserl and Giorgi provide a
basis for some general and specific comparisons. In
general, Husserl gave greater priority to subjectivity and
consciousness than did Giorgi. This fact is reflected in
his transcendental idealism. Giorgi, on the other hand,
moves away from his predecessor by taking an existential
and human scientific perspective.

Husserl's Transcendental Idealism

Husserl has been criticized for the emphasis he placed
on subjectivity, or first person experience (Ricoeur,
1967). His philosophic position, known as transcendental
idealism, emphasizes consciousness over objects to the
extent that it sees objectivity as an accomplishment of
consciousness. Actually, Husserl was quite aware of this
tendency in his work and discussed it in the fourth
meditation of Cartesian Meditations (1977a) when he wrote:

> Phenomenology is eo ipso 'transcendental
> idealism,' though in a fundamentally and
> essentially new sense. It is not a psychological
> idealism. . . . Nor is it a Kantian idealism
> which believes it can keep open the possibility
> of a world of things in themselves. On the
> contrary, we have here a transcendental idealism
> that is nothing more than a consequentially
> executed self-explication in the form of a
> systematic egological science, an explication of
> my ego as subject of every possible cognition,
> and indeed with respect to every sense of what

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exists, wherewith the latter might be able to
have a sense for me, the ego. (p. 86)

Regarding this idealistic tendency, Ricoeur (1967)
commented that the major pitfall of idealistic philosophies
is the difficulty they have providing an adequate analysis
of the reality of others and the world. This pitfall
emerges when the ego gains a position so central to one's
philosophic position as to suggest that it is the only true
reality.

Constitution of Others

In order for Husserl to show that his philosophic
stance does not end up in an ego-centric predicament, or
solus ipse, he addressed the phenomenological question
about how others can be understood as constituted in
consciousness. He began the fifth meditation of Cartesian
Meditations (1977a) by making a list of the most convincing
modes of givenness of others. This isolated the field of
the problem. From this list arose three givens: (a) The
other is not just a natural object, but also a experiential
center as I am myself; (b) the world has an objectivity of
its own; and (c) the objective status of cultural objects
refers back to the experience.

Husserl observed that the other is always present
within the locus of immediate experience. This did not
mean that the other is within one, but that one must exist
before it is possible to grasp or regard the other. He
placed a high priority on immediate subjective experience,

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and a lower priority on the objects of that subjective experience. As Husserl (1977a) saw it, the other is "constituted in my monad as mirroring itself in my ego" (p. 108). The goal, then, was to grasp the ownness sphere of the other as the antecedent foundation for the constitution of the other as other. This would preserve respect for the reality of the other while recognizing the primacy of the transcendental ego.

His analysis proceeded on the assumption that the analogical grasping of the reality of the other was the means to show how the other is constituted in consciousness. This assumption is carried out with great care and formality, but there are problems with it. It supports the view that consciousness has priority over objects, a position many philosophers are unwilling to take, particularly existentialists. Giorgi, therefore, rejects Husserl's transcendental idealism whiling attempting to use as many of Husserl's concepts and themes that conform to his existential human scientific perspective.

Rejection of Psychologism

While Husserl's transcendental idealism has been criticized for an overemphasis on subjectivity, he has also been credited for his rejection of psychologism (Giorgi, 1982a). Psychologism is the position where scientific and philosophical problems are approached psychologically. In

Giorgi's words, "(Psychologism) . . . is the attempt to explain the necessity of knowledge not in terms of an appeal to the object but rather through an appeal to the psychological connections by which we grasp the object" (p. 90). It is the view that psychology can provide the basis upon which to understand the foundations of science itself and that it can provide the basis for understanding how mathematics and formal logic are possible.

Giorgi (1982a) credited Husserl for rejecting psychologistic thinking on the grounds that it leads to relativism and skepticism. In fact, he rejected all six forms of psychologism identified by de Boer (1978), namely, (a) immanence psychologism, (b) formal psychologism, (c) genetic psychologism, (d) descriptive psychologism, (e) identification psychologism, and (f) pretranscendental psychologism (Giorgi, 1982a).

Both Husserl and Giorgi reject psychologistic thinking while emphasizing the importance of subjectivity and first person experience. In Husserl, however, the emphasis of first person experience was greater than it was for Giorgi. Giorgi sought a balance between objectivity and subjectivity which Husserl did not recognize.

Giorgi's Human Scientific Existentialism

Giorgi's human scientific perspective contrasts in a basic way with Husserl's transcendental idealism. Disagreeing with the extent to which Husserl placed

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emphasis on subjectivity and consciousness, his position
reflects a similar criticism of Husserl raised by other
existential phenomenologists.

Existential Perspective

For Husserl (1977b), phenomenological psychology was
the science providing principles for the understanding of
psychological experience. As an a priori, eidetic science
preceding empirical psychology, its task was to acquire
essences, not facts. Merleau-Ponty (1964) criticized this
position because it led to the conclusion that "everything
essential is furnished by phenomenology, or philosophic
insight. . . . Nothing more is left to empirical psychology
than to study certain empirical curiosities within the
frames that are furnished by phenomenology" (1964, p. 66).
He explained:

> Phenomenologists, above all Husserl, have always
> felt that psychology was concerned with a very
> distinctive type of knowledge. It is not
> inductive . . . but neither is it reflective
> . . . that is, a return to the a priori which
> would determine the form of all human
> experience. One may say indeed that
> psychological knowledge is reflection but that it
> is at the same time an experience. . . .
> Phenomenological psychology is therefore a search
> for the essence, or meaning, but not apart from
> the facts. Finally, this essence is accessible
> only in and through the individual situation in
> which it appears. When pushed to the limit,
> eidetic psychology becomes analytic-existential.
> (p. 95)

Agreeing with Merleau-Ponty and the existential
critics of Husserl's transcendental idealism, Giorgi

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(1970a) considered the objects of consciousness as no less

primordial than the consciousness or intentionality

correlated to them. Sokolowski (1964) made this point when

he wrote:

> The existence of the world as a transcendent
> horizon for our experience and encounter is
> apodictic, it is the background against which all
> individual instances of knowing take place. . . .
> But consciousness, or intentionality, cannot be
> conceived apart from such as real, 'worldly'
> correlative. The intentionality of consciousness
> is ordered towards what is. . . . Consciousness
> demands the world as its correlative; this is as
> apodictic in phenomenology as the claim that the
> sense of the world requires consciousness as a
> correlative supplement to itself. (pp. 219-220)

This shift in perspective was what introduced

existential thought into phenomenology. According to De

Waelhens (1962), existential phenomenology is the

acceptance of the "complete inherence of the cogito in a

facticity from which it is inseparable" (p. 142). It is

the "identification of this being-in-the-world with an

implicit understanding of this being in which the humanness

of experience ultimately has its realization" (p. 142). A

consequence of this shift was that empirical psychology

became less sharply distinguished from phenomenology.

There was a shift in emphasis from Husserlian metascience

to the existential analysis of the lifeworld.

As an existential phenomenologist, Giorgi (1982a)

focused more on the intentional interdependence of

objectivity and subjectivity. This contrasted Husserl's

work in Cartesian Meditations where the relation of world

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and consciousness is nearly the same as that of content and form (see Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 65).

Giorgi's (1970a) view of phenomenological psychology did not emphasize consciousness over objects in the manner of Husserl. Neither did it attempt to sharply distinguish between phenomenological psychology and empirical psychology.

Human Science

Giorgi's view is more deeply rooted in the existential lifeworld than Husserl's. It is more closely identified with and tied to the world of everyday experience. The character of Giorgi's work is post-Husserlian because it extends the notion of phenomenology into a direction largely unexplored by Husserl, namely, human science. It does not attempt simply to further develop the line of thought originally developed by Husserl, but rather "to use as many concepts from Husserl as possible while at the same time practicing science in a manner relevant to everyday affairs, problems, and concerns" (p. 91). He said: "We are trying to . . . integrate as much as possible of the insights of Husserl for our understanding of phenomenological psychology that is consistent with good scientific practice" (p. 91). Giorgi is as committed to practical science as he is to theoretical and philosophical psychology. He developed a framework for doing phenomenological research with subjects. At the same time,

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his work retains the heuristic value of the Husserl's earlier work.

Giorgi is guided by many of Husserl's phenomenological themes. His work, however, is not a mere extension of Husserl's. While accepting many basic notions from Husserl and seeking similar objectives, Giorgi remains closer to lived experience than Husserl. Both recognize the influence that the researcher's presence has on the research process. Both use reflection and imagination as methodological techniques, emphasize description over explanation, and seek to discover and confirm the psychological essences and structures of human expressions.

Role of Interpretation

While conceiving phenomenological research as descriptive in approach, Giorgi has also recognized the role of interpretation (see Giorgi, Knowles, & Smith, 1979, p. 179-181). Unlike Husserl's almost exclusive preoccupation with pure description, Giorgi saw interpretion as an inescapable part of the research process (see Titelman's, 1979, discussion of this point). Husserl's goal of presuppositionlessness, therefore, is technically unachievable. Even the process of selecting what to describe is interpretation.

A concrete example of this fact can be taken from journalism. Usually regarded as a profession requiring the unbiased description of the reporter, the journalist is always involved in interpretation. This is the case even when the facts are stated as objectively as possible. The journalist who films a riot in Los Angeles, or the evacuation of refugees in Southeast Asia, is selecting what to film. This is interpretation. While the film data are descriptive of the riot or evacuation, the filmmaker's decision-making processes are evident at all times. Phenomena are always caught up in a context that includes the approach of the researcher. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the researcher to describe the approach of research as soon as possible. Attempting to describe naively, the researcher examines how descriptions suggest personal viewpoints and perspectives.

Structure of Methodology

At the beginning of this study, the question was raised about the general structure of the phenomenological method. Upon reviewing the methodology sections of several phenomenological dissertations from the California School of Professional Psychology, Fresno campus, it became evident that differing concepts and procedures were being used. It is now possible to discuss the general structure of the phenomenological method in terms of what Husserl and Giorgi have provided.

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It appears that the phenomenological methodologies of Husserl and Giorgi share a number of general structural themes. These themes include (a) emphasizing the lifeworld of everyday experience, (b) taking a descriptive approach to research instead of explanatory, (c) employing an abstention or epoche from theoretical assumptions, (d) using a phenomenological reduction to access the level of psychological phenomena, (e) searching for psychological essences or structures, and (f) using the technique of imaginative variation in this search. While the meaning of these themes differ from Husserl to Giorgi, they also have considerable resemblance.

For Husserl, the description focuses on essences constituting major concepts and themes of empirical psychology and the human sciences. For Giorgi, the description focuses on psychological experiences as reported by individuals living through specific situations. Examples of such experiences include being anxious, depressed, jealous, trusting, and angry. For Giorgi, description is more specific than it is for Husserl.

In <u>abstention</u>, or epoche, the researcher has put-out-of-play as many personal suppositions about the subject of research as possible. In this step, the natural attitude of the researcher is bracketed or suspended. The researcher avoids personal and subjective biases through a

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process of becoming distanced from these preconceptions and expectations. For Husserl, this bracketing process is focused largely on assumptions of the natural scientific perspective. What is bracketed are the presumptions about a real world to be explored by sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology. The assumptions to be suspended include ideas about a real world external to consciousness, about time and space as facts of nature, and about logic as a natural law unrelated to human consciousness and understanding.

For Giorgi, on the other hand, research abstention pertains to concrete phenomena and situations. The expectations and assumptions of the researcher that need to be suspended may pertain to such topics as alcoholism, juvenile delinquency, and domestic violence. The recognition and description of the researcher's perspective and understanding of these topics are addressed throughout the research process. This is done in order to make apparent and accessible to fellow scientists and practitioners the theoretical approach and stance of the researcher. It is considered important that the researcher describe initial, as well as developing, expectations and perspectives on the research topic.

The role of the phenomenological reduction is to provide access to psychological phenomena per se by ascertaining the psychological in isolation of the

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physical. In the lifeworld, these are presented simultaneously. Through the reduction, the psychological is abstracted from the physical through reflection. The researcher reflects on data from the lifeworld and abstracts psychological essences and intentional structures. For Husserl, these essences and intentional structures require a highly reflective process. Such a high degree of reflection is necessary to identify the kind of essences Husserl is after. For Giorgi, on the other hand, the essences and intentional structures do not require such a high degree of philosophical and metascientific reflection. The degree of reflection needed is that which will reveal something meaningful about naive, lifeworld descriptions collected from research subjects.

The imaginative variation and the search for essences are highly related steps in the phenomenological method. They take the bracketed and psychologically reduced experiences as their point of departure. In general, the researcher imagines possible variants on an object of investigation in order to clearly grasp its defining essence and intentional structure. To specify the essence, intentional structure, and meaning of a phenomenon requires imaginative work on the part of the researcher. The general characteristic of a phenomenon is that which remains stable across imaginative examples. For Husserl, the imaginative variation is performed self-reflectively

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upon phenomena present within the researchers own conscious experience. For Giorgi, the variation of examples refers to descriptive data provided by research subjects. In either case, the essence or structure of some phenomenon is examined in the imagination of the researcher.

For Giorgi and Husserl, the phenomenological method appears to be composed of several common themes. While the themes are put to different uses by each theorist, the general purposes of the themes are theoretically similar. The general structure of the phenomenological method appears to be composed of themes that can be variously interpreted while retaining their identity in these different conceptions.

Role of the Reduction

The second question raised by this study regarded the role of the phenomenological reduction. In the phenomenological dissertations reviewed, three of four identified the reduction as an integral step in this form of research. With regard to our review of Husserl and Giorgi, the role of the phenomenological reduction was seen to differ depending on the kind of phenomena it is meant to access. For Husserl, the reduction was the process through which the researcher achieved access to the most general and abstract psychological essences. When Husserl spoke about the psychological reduction, he referred to the means by which a priori psychic phenomena were located and

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studied. By this, he intended to reflect on the theoretical foundations of empirical psychology and the human sciences.

Another role of the reduction was philosophical. The reduction was also the means of access to transcendental phenomena. Therefore, it was necessary for transcendental philosophy. It led to the realm of transcendental phenomena, that is, phenomena necessary for the possibility of any experience whatever. Husserl's psychological reduction was intended to make philosophical inquiry possible by providing the point of departure for that questioning.

For Giorgi, on the other hand, the phenomenological reduction was intended to access psychological essences and structures of a more concrete and individual kind. In contrast to Husserl's uses of the psychological reduction, Giorgi (1983a) understands the reduction as the process by which the researcher accesses concrete psychological phenomena. Such phenomena are those which always remain tied to experiences in the everyday lifeworld. Giorgi's psychological phenomenological reduction accesses phenomena relevant to individual lifeworld experiences and therefore human scientific psychology. Because of this, it is more relevant to clinical research. It is more useful for clinical research since it can be focused on individual experiences.

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For Giorgi (1982a), the researcher analyzes descriptions of subjects from "within a phenomenological psychological reduction" (p. 97). By this, he means that the researcher analyzes the descriptions as meanings experienced by the subjects. In his words, the reduction is:

> A form of intentional analysis since what is experienced is correlated with the acts of the subject and interpreted as 'for the subject' rather than as objectively true. On the other hand, the experiencing subject is taken to be a real person in the world not only with a specifically human form of consciousness but also possibily as this specific form of consciousness. (p. 97)

The phenomenological reduction is the step by which the researcher understands the psychological phenomenon being investigated as an intentional structure for a subject.

While Giorgi recognizes the importance of Husserl's contributions to phenomenological psychology, he himself takes a more existential perspective. Using concepts from Husserl, he revises them to function within his existential human scientific framework. He follows in the footsteps of Merleau-Ponty and other existential psychologists who moved away from Husserl's preexistential phenomenological psychology.

This analysis of the role of the reduction clarifies its function as the means of access to psychological phenomena. In Husserl's case, the reduction made possible the investigation of the most general psychological

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phenomena. For Giorgi, the phenomena addressed are from the lifeworld, and therefore, more concrete and situational. Since the phenomena of greatest clinical relevance are those that inform us about practical situations and personal experiences, it is Giorgi's conception of the reduction that is applicable to clinical and other practical psychological research.

Meaning of Sample Size

The third question raised by this study regarded the meaning of sample size. In the four phenomenological dissertations reviewed, three types of criteria were used for the determination of sample size. They involved (a) the researcher's experience of saturation, or satisfaction, regarding the quality and amount of data collected; (b) pragmatic factors influencing the research situation; and (c) theoretical demands emerging out of prior research and discussion. More specifically, saturation was achieved when the subjective experiences of the researcher indicated a level of understanding about the phenomenon that was adequate to the purposes and goals of the research. Saturation was achieved in sampling when the data appeared rich with information.

Pragmatic factors influenced sample size when any of a number of practical concerns dictated a decision about the termination of data collection. Such concerns included the availability of subjects, the time frame of the research

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project, and the limitations of funding. Finally, the theoretical criteria influenced sample size through the design of sampling procedures based on existing theory and research. Theory influenced sampling process during, as well as in advance of, actual data collection.

On this basis, it appears that the phenomenological meaning of sample size is based on at least three types of factors. This is in sharp contrast to Husserl's view of the issue. Actually, the meaning of sample size was never raised by Husserl since, from his perspective, it was not a research issue. For Husserl, phenomenological research in psychology was to be performed self-reflectively. He did not use research subjects since his method was designed to derive its results from personal introspection. The work of the phenomenological psychologist was to be accomplished through the application of the researcher's own imagination. The help of others, or subjects, was not required. Such assistance, however, might occur through the feedback, discussions, and criticisms of others.

In Giorgi's writings, the meaning of sample size has yet to be addressed at length. Consequently, it is not possible to determine his position on the issue. His discussion of the phenomenological meaning of psychological data, however, provides a good basis for some speculation about his position. Regarding data, Giorgi has made clear that there is an important difference between natural

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scientific and human scientific information. What constitutes psychological data for Bacon or Locke is quite different than it is for Kant or Hegel. It is quite different, again for Dilthey or Rickert. For Husserl, Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, psychological data have different meanings again.

The data collected by human scientific psychologists are nonphysical. They consist of meanings and intentions. Therefore, the meaning of sample size is related to the researcher's understanding of these nonphysical data. Factors influencing that understanding include the degree to which an understanding of the phenomenon has been achieved and the degree to which additional understanding is expected through continued research. Overall, the phenomenological meaning of sample size appears to be multidimensional.

Summary of Results

This review and comparison has identified similarities and differences between Husserl and Giorgi on (a) the structure of the phenomenological method, (b) the role of the phenomenological reduction, and (c) the meaning of sample size. Comparing Husserl and Giorgi has shown that there is a general methodological structure shared by the two theorists. That structure includes the themes of description, abstention (epoche), phenomenological reduction, ideation or imaginative variation, and the

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search for essences or structures. As a method, it uses reflection and imagination in a rigorous way to define the essences and structures of psychological phenomena. First, it does so by putting out of play the interference of any natural scientific assumptions that may bias the outcome of research. Second, it utilizes a rigorously defined manner of grasping structural, thematic, and essential qualities of the psychological phenomena under investigation.

Comparing Husserl and Giorgi also showed that the phenomenological reduction is a form of reflective abstraction that separates the physical from the psychological. It provides access to psychological experiences qua intentionality and exclusive of physical assumptions. It takes everyday experience and strips it of realistic biases. To the extent possible, such assumptions and beliefs are disengaged from practice.

Also discussed was the difference between Husserl and Giorgi on the issue of subject-design research. An important distinguishing feature in their respective approaches was the fact that Husserl used the method of self-reflection as the exclusive means of research. He did not use research subjects. Giorgi, on the other hand, uses a subject-design research format as well as self-reflection. Data collection is structured by the researcher's understanding of the phenomenon at hand. When

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the phenomenon reveals itself with sufficient clarity, then data collection is terminated

Husserl's philosophical and metascientific concerns for phenomenological psychology contrast the more existential and human scientific perspective of Giorgi. As the founder of this new psychology, Husserl defined it in contradistinction to empirical psychology on the one hand, and transcendental phenomenological philosophy on the other. Intending it as a theoretical discipline, it was meant to precede empirical pursuits such as those produced in psychophysiology, psychobiology, and psychophysics. The rationale for this lay in the need to clarify essences before investigating empirical regularities and differences. For Husserl, the new psychology was to identify the psychic essences definitive of the human sciences. Its results were intended to be qualitative and descriptive in content.

Giorgi, a current expositor and proponent of phenomenological method in psychology, has developed this phenomenological science in a new and creative direction. He has integrated a subject design approach into phenomenological research. Although still developing, Giorgi's perspective appears to share much common ground with Husserl. Both are critical of natural scientific psychology for its attempt to base psychology on the premises of naturalism, physicalism, empiricism,

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positivism, and realism. Both reject psychologism as a basis for scientific endeavour.

While using the conceptual framework and spirit of Husserl's earlier work, Giorgi's work is not a mere extrapolation. The lifeworld experiences of specific individuals captures much of Giorgi's attention. He focuses on psychological phenomena as revealed in individual experience. Such phenomena include learning, anxiety, jealousy, anger, and trust. This is in contrast to Husserl, who focuses on the abstract essences definitive of empirical psychology and the human sciences including, for example, such essences as perception, the ego, and the body.

Based on these differences, it can be concluded that Husserl's psychological methodology is not appropriate for clinical research. On the other hand, Giorgi's subject-design research approach is useful for clinical and practical research since it does not rely entirely on the descriptions and self-reflections of the researcher.

Chapter 5

DISCUSSION

The following is a discussion of (a) the relation of
behaviorism and phenomeonology, (b) the value of studying
pretheoretical experience, (c) consciousness as a valid
subject matter for psychology, (d) the verification of
research results, and (e) the advantages and disadvantages
of phenomenological research.

Behaviorism and Phenomenology

The relation of behaviorism and phenomenology is a
complex and disputed one. In 1964, the relation of these
two disciplines was the focus of a symposium sponsored by
the American Psychological Association. As the first
formal act of Division 24 of the American Psychological
Association, the Division for Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology, the symposium brought together a number of
authorities from the fields of psychology and philosophy.
Participating in this discussion were B. F. Skinner,
Sigmund Koch, Robert MacLeod, Carl Rogers, Norman Malcolm,
and Michael Scriven.

The symposium provided no clear answer to the question
of the relation of these two theoretical orientations.
Among the experts, there was considerable dissention. The
debate provided evidence of both complementarity and basic

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differences. Wann (1964), the editor of a book based on the proceedings of this conference, observed that the conference "did not work out exactly as planned" (p. v). The expectation was that the above theorists would be at sharp disagreement. In fact, this was not always the case. The title of the symposium could have better reflected the content of the proceedings had it been different, according to Wann. Instead of "Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology," it could have been "Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Complementary Bases for Modern Psychology, With One or Two Dissents" (p. vi).

Summarizing the symposium, Wann (1964) said that four of the six participants "suggested the possibility of coexistence" of behaviorism and phenomenology, with one participant remaining "delightfully intransigent" and the other a "possible dissent" (p. v). For Koch, behaviorism corrupted a true psychology of the human person. For MacLeod, phenomenology represented a challenge for behaviorism to broaden the field of psychology to include consciousness. Rogers found much that is acceptable about behaviorism but maintained that it does not go far enough in taking the consequences of its premises. For Malcolm, behaviorism contained a core of logical truth, but it showed weakness in its treatment of psychological material from the perspective of the first person present tense.

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Scriven saw a possible reconciliation of phenomenology and behaviorism. Skinner was unconvinced that internal states were primary moving forces in man. He preferred to view them as mere epiphenomena lacking the status of actual fact. For Wann (1964), the relation of behaviorism and phenomenology could "neither . . . be resolved, nor put to rest" (p. v). Surely the relation of behaviorism and phenomenology is not likely to be resolved in the near future regardless of the individual merit of each theoretical orientations.

Pretheoretical Experience

In an article published about two decades ago, Brody and Oppenheim (1966) criticized the phenomenological notion of <u>pretheoretical experience</u> as "irrelevant for the construction and test of psychological theory" (p. 297). This criticism is reviewed to see if there is still merit in its objections to phenomenology. The authors identified the subject matter of phenomenology as a special kind of first order facts of experience prior to any theory or conceptualization. These facts were considered private experiences and, therefore, not admissible as scientific data. In contrast to this position, they referred to the subject matter of methodological behaviorism, according to which only those data that are publicly observable are recognized as legitimate (see Bergmann, 1956).

Based on their understanding of pretheoretical experience, Brody and Oppenheim (1966) criticized phenomenological theory on a number of accounts. A first locus of difficulty concerned the communication of research results. While allowing that phenomenological science works to avoid the introduction of hypothetical and theoretical construction in its approach to phenomenal experience, they contended that this approach forced the researcher into the position of being unable to communicate results with others.

Identifying pretheoretical experience with nonconceptual experience, the authors indicated that the nonconceptualized researcher was incapable of distinguishing him- or herself conceptually from that which is being experienced. This identification of the researcher with the researched made impossible the objectification necessary for the verbalization of ideas. Consequently, phenomenological research experiences are preverbal and ineffable. On this basis, the authors contended that phenomenological analysis cannot be used in the construction of conceptual systems, or as a basis for the criticism of conceptual systems.

A second locus of difficulty concerned scientific explanation. Using the definition of explanation given by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), the concept was understood as the process by which science makes reference to the

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application of theory. Brody and Oppenheim (1966) claimed
that phenomenology cannot use explanatory systems because
it must remain essentially intuitive and empathic. It has
no reference to the application of theory. If
phenomenology does construct some kind of conceptual system
to communicate its ideas, such a system can only be viewed
as an heuristic device limited to the context of discovery,
with questionable relationship to the actual construction
of theories based on fact.

A third area of difficulty involved hypothesis
testing. For the authors, hypothesis testing is performed
in the context of verification by scientific peers. Since
phenomenology is regarded as purely subjective and
unrelated to verification, they asserted that it cannot
engage in hypothesis testing. The authors claimed that
only the methods of the behaviorist can be used to test
theoretical systems and that only the methods of the
behaviorist can be used to construct theoretical systems.

The claims that phenomenological science cannot
provide research results communicable to others, that it is
unrelated to the application of theories, and that
hypothesis testing through peer verification is impossible
appear to be based on a disregard for the value of
pretheoretical experience as a scientific notion. They
appear to take this notion as proof of the irrelevance of
phenomenology for true scientific enterprise.

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The notion of pretheoretical experience was developed
to designate a realm of human experience that is lived
rather than thought about, in which experience dominates
over ideas. This realm of immediae human experience is
more primary than the realm of theory construction and
systematic thought. It is the basis upon which theories
are developed.

Pretheoretical experience, therefore, refers to the
basis upon which communication occurs. It does not
eliminate communication. It provides a means of
understanding both public and private experiences. It does
not intend to deal with experiences inaccessible to
others. It is concerned with subjectivity and
consciousness as valid parts of all human experience. It
is not unrelated to others. Consequently, pretheoretical
experience is important for phenomenology. It is the level
of experience in which life runs its course.

The researcher's descriptions of this level of
experience reflects the naive, unmolded language and
understanding of the subjects' experience. Analyses and
interpretations in psychological language follow. In
response to the challenges of Brody and Oppenheim (1966),
it can be claimed that phenomenological science does
communicate results, provide a basis for scientific
explanation, and develop hypotheses.

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Consciousness as Subject Matter

The phenomenological call for the inclusion of consciousness, or subjectivity, as subject matter for psychology is definitive of its approach. While behaviorists have wished to eliminate all reference to consciousness from psychology, or at least to reduce it to empirical and objectifiable objects, phenomenologists reject these attempts. In phenomenology, the subjective dimension of life is a necessary and primary subject matter for psychology.

MacLeod (1964) clarified this point when he criticizes the traditional experimental methodologies of Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt, Titchener, and the modern gestalt psychologists. He pointed out that the perspective of these natural scientific psychologists is that consciousness is not a psychological datum since it cannot be quantified or measured. As a result, nuances and ambiguities of immediate first person experience are excluded. He explained that:

> Colors and sounds are data; so are impressions of distance and duration; so are feelings of attraction and repulsion; so are yearnings and fears, ecstasies and disillusionments; so are all the relations--ranging from the crude and obvious to the delicate and intangible--with which the world presents us. (p. 51)

For MacLeod, the data of experience are not limited to what is measurable by traditional physical or natural scientific means.

Therefore, natural scientific assumptions pervade the conceptual frameworks of scientists such as Helmholtz, Wundt, Fechner and Titchener. As an example, the introspectionism of Titchener was based on the metaphor of physics and chemistry. For Titchener, to introspect was to attempt to analyze the data of experience into irreducible elements of sensations, feelings, and images. Each of these elements was considered to have attributes of quality, intensity, extensity, protensity, and attensity (Boring, 1950). In this sense, introspection was analogous to physical and chemical analysis where the goal was to identify irreducible elements that combine in various ways to make up the substance being investigated, in this case, subjective experience.

In contrast to this physical approach, phenomenology considers presuppositionless description as a better basis upon which to analyze experience. It recognizes that the phenomenal world has meanings that cannot be extracted from experience, and that the meaning of a particular sensation is itself not reducible to a gradation of sensation. Its approach is human scientific in character.

Verification of Results

The verification of phenomenological results requires mental processes involving reflection and thinking. Results are verified through the researcher's phenomenological mode of understanding. This is similar to

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mathematics where the physical world is not necessary for verification. In mathematics, the objects of investigation are numbers and symbols. To prove the Pythagorean Theorem, a physical demonstration is not necessary. There is only need for a verbal or written proof. There is no requirement that a mathematical result be proven by physical example. Zaner (1967) explained that:

> Numbers are no more physical things susceptible of sense perception than are experiences as the phenomenologist studies them. And, proof in the latter case ought to be no more difficult than proof in the former; because my reflection is mine alone does not mean that what I reflect upon is also mine alone, any more than numerical entities and relations are private to the mind of the individual mathematician. (p. 323)

Following this line of thought, verification in phenomenology is similar. In both, the subject matter under investigation is mental, not physical. In mathematics, numbers, symbols and their relationships are the objects. In phenomenology, the objects are meanings, concepts, ideas, intentions, essences, structures, and experiences. Whether they are general or specific objects, they are always related to the lifeworld of human experience. Phenomenology investigates states of affairs accessible through reflection. Validity of research results are, therefore, tested in reflection.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Some of the advantages and disadvantages of phenomenological research include the following. Regarding

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advantages, there are several basic points. First, phenomenological research brings the researcher into closer contact with the experiences of subjects as these experiences are lived. Its findings remain closer to the real context of life experiences. One of the implications of this study is that this form of research is more communicable to nonresearchers. Another implication is that the emphasis on experience requires that there is greater concern for the examination of individual cases, rather than large numbers of cases. This approach assumes that the investigation of individual cases is often instructive about phenomena common to countless other cases. Much of what is grasped in an individual way is expected to be encountered again in others in similar ways. Consequently, it is not so much the number of cases that is important but the extent to which the inner exploration of the individual case is achieved.

In contrast to phenomenological research, statistical research is often painfully removed from actual life situations. While the constructs and measures of such research are initially developed from life, it is often difficult to translate them back to life. Fischer, C., (1984) noted that "they sometimes take on lives of their own, for example, personality traits as causes of crime, or fear ratings as consequences of crimes reported on television" (p. 173). However, this does not mean that

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qualitative and quantitative research cannot be profitably used together.

Second, investigations can focus on existential themes that have relevance for personality theory and philosophy. Ellenberger (1958) noted that the researcher reflectively and imaginatively searches for "genetic-structural factors" around which to organize the entire content of the subjects' descriptive reports (p. 99). Attention is paid to formulating a genetic principle according to which the experience of the patient is understood. The structure of the world in which the patient lives is analyzed according to existential, a priori, categories, such as spatiality, temporality, causality, and will. The researcher looks for disruptions, abnormalities, anomalies, and other departures from the expected. The categorical analysis of the experience of the patient is performed to determine variations in such a priori dimensions.

Third, phenomenology can help to validate previous research. The use of descriptive, rather than explanatory techniques, prevents the intrusion of a theoretical model. Data come from interviews, written accounts, and existing descriptions. They are not numerically determined. The psychological value of these data are analyzed for intentions. This intentional analysis occurs during the reading, rereading, and examination of the data for structural features. The situated structures and

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psychological meanings are listed. The further comparison

of these situated structures and meanings yields a general

structure of the phenomenon.

These situated and general structures of psychological

phenomena are of relevance to other professionals. As

Fischer, C., (1984) noted:

> [Phenomenological findings] permit policy makers
> and service providers to see concrete points of
> intervention into the lives of communities and
> individuals. Such findings can be communicated
> directly to the public; citizens can see the
> extent to which the findings match their own
> experience. Because the findings perserve the
> temporal unfolding of the event, readers are able
> to identify the points at which research or their
> own experience matches the phenomenological
> structure. In addition, the findings can be of
> help in planning appropriate time of
> interventions. (p. 173)

Phenomenology can be of help to assure relevance in

statistical research. In return, statistical research can

be of help in determining the generalizabililty of

phenomenological findings. Fischer, C., (1984) indicated

that:

> Phenomenological research can explore the
> essential constituents of a life situation to
> help assure the relevance of the indirect
> measures later chosen for quantitative research.
> Given this base, one is less likely to lose sight
> of what those statistical measures mean in
> subjects' lives. In turn, quantitative analyses
> can both clarify and raise questions about
> phenomenological findings, and can indicate
> whether the latter extend to broader samples.
> Qualitative and quantitive data can also be
> examined jointly to explore the relation between
> individuals' living of situations and the
> influence of the surrounding environment as
> measured by observers. (p. 174)

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Fourth, the use of qualitative with quantitative

research can be a clarifying follow-up to traditional

studies. Fischer, C., (1984) explained that "once a trend

has been identified via statistical methods, the life

events from which that trend was derived can be explored

qualitatively" (p. 174). For example:

> A university may discover that its highest
> attrition rate is among commuter students. At
> that point, a sample of these students can be
> sent questionnaires asking them directly about
> their dissatisfactions. If that does not
> sufficiently reveal reasons or points of
> intervention, then the experience of commuter
> students at that university can be studies
> qualitatively. In turn, the representativeness
> of these findings can be tested through a broadly
> distributed rating form based on the qualitative
> findings. Such back and forth movement between
> phenomenological and statistical or categorical
> data is an ideal model for research.
> (pp. 174-175)

Fifth, phenomenology operationalizes the use of the

researcher's imagination and reflection. In traditional

psychology, the generation of scientific hypotheses often

involves making hunches, having intuitions, mulling-over,

asking educated guesses, and the creative interpretation of

previous research findings and theory. In phenomenology,

these imaginative and reflective activities are

incorporated into the methodology. The phenomenologist

engages in imaginative variations and intentional analyses

on the research data.

Regarding disadvantages, there are also a number of

points to be made. These include that: (a) The data

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analyses are time-consuming, (b) the descriptive results
are often lengthy, (c) published results are often
difficult to abstract, (d) editors may find it difficult to
judge the value of qualitative studies, and (e) it is
limited to people's retrospective reports (see
Fischer, C., 1984).

Despite these limitations, phenomenological research
promises to provide worthwhile explorations into the
lifeworld and human experience. It has growing
significance in contemporary American psychology. Doctoral
dissertations have doubled in the past 10 years and there
has been a corresponding increase in the number of
sponsoring institutions. The most recent research has
begun covering a wider range of content areas including
clinical research. Phenomenology provides a viable
humanistic alternative to traditional empirical and
quantitative research methods.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISSERTATIONS

IN 1972

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Welch, C. A. (1972). Guilt in selected plays of Arthur Miller: A phenomenological inquiry and creative response. United States International University.

APPENDIX B

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISSERTATIONS

IN 1973

134

1973

Becker, C. S. (1973). A phenomenological explication of friendship: As exemplified by most important college women friends. Duquesne University.

Braun, M. C. (1973). Heroin: Phenomenological aspects of its use and group treatment. University of Southern California.

Ehrlich, J. H. (1973). An existential look at aging. California School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles.

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APPENDIX C

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISSERTATIONS

IN 1982

136

1982

Aanstoos, C. M. (1982). A phenomenological study of thinking as it is exemplified during chess playing. Duquesne University.

Aharoni, A. (1982). Israeli Arab university students' perceptions of their educational and social experience in israel. University of Michigan.

Atkinson, S. J. (1982). A phenomenological study of women who seek therapy from a woman therapist at a women's center. University of Pittsburgh.

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Geraghty, B. A. (1982). Development of a phenomenological scale of drawing characteristics that indicate emotional disturbance in boys nine and ten years old: For use by public school teachers. United States International University.

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McNally, C. (1982). The experience of being sensitive. Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities.

Mendelowitz, E. M. (1982). Conflict and change: The boundary experience in literature and existential psychotherapy. California School of Professional Psychology, Berkeley.

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Mottaghipour, Y. (1982). The humanistic-existential approach to child therapy: A methodology for practice and research. University of Southern California.

Polyzoi, E. (1982). An examination of the experience of immigration: A movement from a familiar to a strange frame of reference. University of Toronto, Canada.

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Sheldon, A. M. (1982). A phenomenological inquiry into the use of transitional objects in psychotherapy by adult borderline patients. Georgia State University, College of Arts and Sciences.

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Simmons-Kiecker, J. (1982). Male executives' work experience with female executives: A phenomenological study. United States International University.

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    sexual response as effected by sexual distress
    therapy. Saybrook Institute.

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    relaxed: An empirical-phenomenological study.
    Duquesne University.

Williams, C. P. (1982). Therapeutic speaking contrasted
    with pedagogical speaking: An empirical
    pheno nological investigation. Duquesne University.

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    phenomenological study of preschool children's
    experiences. University of Michigan.

Zipris, A. B. (1982). Being lonely: An empirical-
    phenomenological investigation. Duquesne University.

Zuker, R. F. (1982). Being and becoming: A comparison of
    client-centered and existential psychotherapy. Duke
    University.

APPENDIX D

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISSERTATIONS

IN 1983

140

Abrahams, M. N. (1983). A phenomenological adaptation of the Tibetan buddhist doctrine of psychic centers to a metatheoretical hierarchy of human motivation. University of Maryland.

Accaria, P. L. (1983). A phenomenological investigation of the experience of callilng. United States International University.

Alpern, N. (1983). Men and menstruation: A phenomenological investigation of men's experience of menstruation. Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities.

Arnold, K. D. (1983). Temperature veridicality and its relation to age, grade, self-awareness, conservation, phenomenological--real understanding, and "how is your logic". Ohio State University.

Beck, G. R. (1983). The experience of the long-term marriage relationship. Union For Experimenting Colleges and Universities.

Berger, A. L. (1983). The role of irrational cognitions in the phenomenology of anger and guilt in parents of disturbed children. Hofstra University.

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Brooke, R. W. A. (1983). An empirical phenomenological investigation of being-guity. University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.

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Derrick, J. D. (1983). The experience of early retirement of men training for a second career. United States International University.

Dichner, M. D. (1983). The heroin experience: Users' recollections of heroin's attractive effects. Saybrook Institute.

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Edmands, M. S. (1983). <u>An emotionally disturbed child within the family: A phenomenological study of the mother's experience</u>. Boston University, School of Education.

Ensworth, H. M. (1983). <u>A phenomenological and content analysis of religious ideation among schizophrenics</u>. Fuller Theological Seminary, School of Psychology.

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Goren, J. A. (1983). <u>Now that the children are gone: A phenomenological study of the empty nest transition</u>. Union of Experimenting Colleges and Universities.

Hartung, C. O. (1983). <u>A phenomenological inquiry into the experience of interpersonal discomfort</u>. University of California, Los Angeles.

Horton, R. C. (1983). <u>Logoanalysis as a group treatment for existential vacuum and weight loss in obese women</u>. University of Southern California.

Isenberg, E. (1983). <u>The experience of evil: A phenomenological approach</u>. California Institute of Asian Studies.

Jones, B. J. (1983). <u>The experience of intuition</u>. Saybrook Institute.

Kjelson, R. (1983). <u>A phenomenological study of four fathers' experiences of active involvement in the pregnancy, birth and early childhood periods of their children's lives (parenthood, infancy, adult development)</u>. California Institute of Asian Studies.

Lund, K. (1983). <u>Sensory isolation in the Samadhi tank: Phenomenology and the impact on stress related mood states</u>. California School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles.

Martin, C. M. (1983). <u>Schizophrenia and the differential functioning of the cerebral hemispheres: A phenomenological study of delusions and hallucinations</u>. Fielding Institute.

142

Monte, E. P. (1983). <u>The phenomenology of virtual parenthood: A qualitative study of significant experiential themes when imagining oneself as a possible parent</u>. University of Waterloo, Canada.

O'Connor, D. J. (1983). <u>Significant life experiences of eminent persons: A phenomenological study</u>. United States International University.

Packer, M. J. (1983). <u>The structure of moral conflict: A hermeneutic study of conflict resolution in young adults' friendship groups</u>. University of California, Berkeley.

Partin, R. (1983). <u>Let there be no mistake: "I am." A phenomenological study of the experience of rage</u>. Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities.

Rourke, P. G. (1983). <u>The experience of being inspired</u>. Saybrook Institute.

Safter, H. T. (1983). <u>A phenomenological case study of highly gifted and creative adolescents</u>. University of Georgia.

Schultz, D. J. (1983). <u>The experience of self- reclamation of former Catholic religious women</u>. Saybrook Institute.

Seabaugh, M. O. L. (1983). <u>The vulnerable self of the adult child of an alcoholic: A phenomenorlogical derived theory</u>. University of Southern California.

Sherry, R. (1983). <u>Joint decision-making: The parental decision to seek psychological help for their child: An empirical-phenomenological investigation</u>. Duquesne University.

Siegel, R. D. (1983). <u>A comparison of Freud's and Jung's approaches to dream interpretation (Hermeneutic)</u>. Rutgers University, State University of New Jersey.

Snyder, M. (1983). <u>The essential meaning(s) of the dyadic love relationship as manifested and experienced in the daily lives and characteristic interactions of functional, intimate, committed, primary, heterosexual couples: A phenomenological study</u>. Fielding Institute.

143

Spencer, H. C. (1983). The development of an existential model of depression in women. University of Southern California.

Sterman, P. S. (1983). Transcendence or tranquilization: An existential perspective on chemical dependency. United States International University.

Stevick, E. (1983). Being angry in the context of an intimate relationship: An existential phenomenological investigation. Duquesne University.

Topper, C. J. (1983). Carl Rogers and philosophical phenomenology. George Washington University.

Williams, J. E. (1983). An empirical phenomenological study of witnessing spouse abuse as a preadolescent. University of Pittsburgh.

Wong, K. S. (1983). Chinese American Women: A phenomenological study of self-concept. Wright Institute.

APPENDIX E

THEMES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL

DISSERTATIONS IN 1972

.

1972

Athletics
Diabetes
Wearing aniseikonic lenses
Celebration
Observation
Encounter
Swearing
Subjectivity and objectivity
Sleep
Guilt

146

APPENDIX F

THEMES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL

DISSERTATIONS IN 1973

147

1973

Friendship
Heroin use and treatment
Aging
Self-concept
Community environments
Being-understood
Group-psychotherapy
Being-in-time
Resettlement in immigrants
Encounter
Wisdom and Health

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APPENDIX G

THEMES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL

DISSERTATIONS IN 1982

149

1982

Thinking	Education and society
Women	Confiding
Mid-career men	Time
Cancer	Drawing
Stress	Shyness
Being-sensitive	Conflict and change
Child therapy	Immigration
Homosexual identity	Confusion
Being-fat	Healing and psychosis
Healing	Success
Transitional objects	Control
Work experience	Alienation and youth
Self and females	Female sexual response
Relaxation	Therapeutic speaking
Divorce and children	Being-lonely
Being and becoming	

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APPENDIX H

THEMES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL

DISSERTATIONS IN 1983

151

1983

Human motivation	Calling
Menstruation	Temperature
Marriage	Anger and guilt
Loneliness	Guilt
Schizophrenia	Being-anxious
Retirement	Heroin experience
Disturbed child	Schizophrenia
Therapeutic focusing	"Empty nest"
Interpersonal discomfort	Obesity and weight loss
Evil	Intuition
Fathering	Sensory isolation
Delusions and hallucination	Parenthood
Significant life experiences	Moral conflict
Rage	Being-inspired
Creative adolescents	Self-reclamation
Vulnerable self	Decision-making
Dream interpretation	Love relationships
Depression in women	Chemical dependency
Being-angry	Philosophy
Spousal abuse	Self-concept

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APPENDIX I

SCHOOLS PRODUCING PHENOMENOLOGICAL

DISSERTATIONS IN 1972 THROUGH 1973

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1972-1973

California School of Professional Psychology
  Berkeley Campus
  Los Angeles Campus
Duquesne University
Illinois Institute of Technology
New York University
Ohio State University
Pennsylvania State University
United States International University
University of New Mexico
University of Southern California
University of Wyoming
York University, Canada

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APPENDIX J

SCHOOLS PRODUCING PHENOMENOLOGICAL

DISSERTATIONS IN 1982 THROUGH 1983

155

California Institute of Asian Studies
California School of Professional Psychology
  Berkeley Campus
  Fresno Campus
  Los Angeles Campus
  San Diego Campus
Duke University
Duquesne University
Boston University
Boston University, School of Education
Fielding Institute
Fuller Theological Seminary, School of Psychology
George Washington University
Georgia State University
Hofstra University
Saybrook Institute
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
State University of New Jersey
Ohio State University
Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities
United States International University
University of Arizona
University of California, Los Angeles
University of California, Berkeley
University of Georgia
University of Maryland
University of Michigan
University of Pittsburgh
University of Southern California
University of Tennessee
University of Toronto, Canada
University of Waterloo, Canada
Wright Institute

APPENDIX K

STATES FROM WHICH PHENOMENOLOGICAL

DISSERTATIONS WERE PRODUCED DURING

1972-1973 AND 1982-1983

157

1972-1973	1982-1982
California	Arizona
Illinois	California
New Mexico	Georgia
New York	Illinois
Ohio	Maryland
Pennsylvania	Massachusetts
Wyoming	Michigan
	New Jersey
	New York
	North Carolina
	Ohio
	Pennsylvania
	Tennessee
	(Washington D. C.)

APPENDIX L

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISSERTATIONS

FROM THE CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF

PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

159

1973

Stein, D. J. (1973). <u>The phenomenology of resettlement:</u>
<u>An exploration into the experiences of Chinese</u>
<u>immigrants in San Francisco</u>.

1978

De Monteflores, C. (1978). <u>Lesbian sexuality: A</u>
<u>phenomenologically based approach</u>.

Jenkins-Monroe, V. (1978). <u>A phenomenological approach to</u>
<u>the study of cognitive styles in problem-solving of</u>
<u>black children</u>.

Mabrey, W. G. (1978). <u>African-American polygynous</u>
<u>relatedness: An exploratory study utilizing</u>
<u>phenomenological techniques</u>.

Summers, R. (1978). <u>A phenomenological approach to the</u>
<u>intuitive experience</u>.

1979

Burwell, S. L. (1979). <u>The soul of black women: The</u>
<u>hermeneutical method of analysis as applied to the novel</u>
<u>"Corregidora."</u>

1980

Eisenbuch, A. J. (1980). <u>The addictive gambler: An</u>
<u>existential-phenomenological study</u>.

McDermit, W. C. (1980). <u>White men loving black men: An</u>
<u>explication of the experience within on-going erotic</u>
<u>relationships</u>.

Mercer, B. L. (1980). <u>Attitudes toward female</u>
<u>homosexuality: A phenomenological study of Caucasian</u>
<u>heterosexual women with different educational</u>
<u>backgrounds</u>.

160

Montgomery, J. D. (1980). A phenomenological investigation of the premenstrual phase of the menstrual cycle.

Tavano, S. K. (1980). A phenomenological explication of presentence incarceration in an urban jail.

1981

Miller, M.-P. (1981). A phenomenological investigation of the creative process of women poets: The structure, nature, and ontological significance of the creative process.

1982

Mendelowitz, E. M. (1982). Conflict and change: The boundary experience in literature and existential psychotherapy.

Singh, I. (1982). A phenomenological investigation of the experience of alienation for youth in the 1970's.

FRESNO CAMPUS

1976

Nehamen, D. A. (1976). Patient experience of existential responsibility in the therapeutic process: A human crisis.

Valentine, E. E. (1976). The significance of the body in existential psychology: Embodiment and unembodiment.

1979

Pincus, A. M. (1979). Client experience of change in psychotherapy: A phenomenological approach.

Witty, S. K. (1979). The experience of primal therapy: A phenomenological investigation.

161

<u>1980</u>

Navarro, R. J. (1980). <u>The experience of burnout in mental</u>
<u>health professionals: A phenomenological approach</u>.

<u>1981</u>

Kuba, S. A. (1981). <u>Being-in-a-lesbian-family: The</u>
<u>preadolescent child's experience</u>.

Munn, T. L. (1981). <u>The meaning and experience of</u>
<u>aggression in middle adolescence: A phenomenological</u>
<u>approach</u>.

Serabian, B. (1981). <u>The psychological sense of</u>
<u>community: A phenomenological approach to hypothesis</u>
<u>generation</u>.

<u>1982</u>

Eberhardt, E. I. (1982). <u>Experiencing cancer: A</u>
<u>phenomenological study</u>.

Frey, R. (1982). <u>Being a divorced father as primary</u>
<u>parent: A phenomenological investigation</u>.

LOS ANGELES CAMPUS

<u>1973</u>

Ehrlich, J. H. (1973). <u>An existential look at aging</u>.

Reitz, E. C. W. (1973). <u>The phenomenology of cancer</u>
<u>patients: A holistic/Adlerian interpretation of their</u>
<u>early recollections</u>.

<u>1976</u>

Allison, J. R. (1976). <u>Infertility and role conflict: A</u>
<u>phenomenological study of women</u>.

162

1978

Sabath, C. J. (1978). An existential model of
   authenticity: A theoretical and validating study.

1980

Marks, H. T. (1980). An analysis of Abhinavagupta's
   aesthetics: The effects of the Jungian personality
   variables of sensation-intuition, extraversion-
   introversion, and judging-perceiving on aesthetic
   experience.

1981

Reitz, E. C. W. (1981). The phenomenology of cancer
   patients: A holistic/Adlerian interpretation of their
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